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Abstract 
The study set to examine foreign aid effectiveness in the poverty alleviation in rural Tanzania. More 
specifically, it sought to investigate the impact of the Health through Sanitation and Water (HESAWA) 
program among the rural population of Mwanza and Kagera Regions. Twelve villages were studied. 
HESAWA is an aid-supported program through SIDA and Sweden. The Government of Tanzania 
contributes marginally through annual budgetary allocations. Although the program's core objectives 
did not directly target poverty alleviation, its very emphasis on economic growth and social 
development among the rural poor presupposes poverty alleviation as an indirect final objective. 
Moreover, from the early 1990s, the objectives of international development cooperation by various 
donors largely shifted in favour of the war on poverty reduction. Thanks are largely to the conclusion 
of the Cold War and the end of the double standards behaviour among Western donor governments. 
In a similar policy shift, HESAWA's overall mandate was enlarged and focused more pointedly on the 
poverty reduction issues. 
The study found that the program was, on the whole, a failure. Its philosophical orientation which 
emphasized people's participation in drawing up the program's objectives, plans and strategies seem 
to have been hijacked from the very start by the HESAWA bureaucracy as well as some vested national 
functionaries and powerful local interests. Behind the smokescreen of peasant participation, these 
interests tended to enjoy most of the program's benefits. Water points and dug wells were arbitrarily 
located to suit the interests of the powerful local elites. Little wonder that the majority of the poor 
peasants continued to commute long distances to public water points and wells just as they had done 
before to traditional wells. The quality and quantity of water were perceived to be poor by most of the 
peasants that were interviewed. The women, in particular, were dissatisfied with the quality of water, 
its unreliability and, indeed, its high tariffs. 
Moreover, HESAWA's failure to institutionalize the practice of participatory decision-making in its 
program's activities marginalized almost everybody especially women. Indeed, it is important to 
emphasize that women were identified by HESAWA as one of its primary target population. In 
addition, it set aside specific instructional programs and mobilization activities for women. In order 
to ensure full participation of women, fifty percent of the members on the HESAWA Water 
Committees were supposed to be women. Understandably, more women than men collect water for 
their respective households. However, the study found that due to generally weak mobilization 
campaigns and inadequate training programs by HESAWA, fewer women than men participated in the 
day-to-day running of program's activities. Not surprisingly, the burning concerns of women were 
hardly addressed by the male-dominated, often inept, Water Committees. 
Finally, the study found that HESAWA program was not likely to be sustainable in the medium and 
long runs. Here, two arguments are in order. Firstly, various water technologies that were installed 
in different villages were neither locally replicable, nor financially affordable. They were not only of 
different levels of technological sophistication but they were largely inappropriate in a predominantly 
peasant setting. The fact that well over two-thirds of the water facilities in the phased out villages in 
the two regions were in disrepair, illustrates what actually is in store for the entire HESAWA program. 
 iii 
Secondly, and closely related to the previous argument, is the issue of sustainability after donor 
financial contributions come to an end. According to this study it is not self evident that either the 
government of Tanzania or the current beneficiaries are likely to fill the void. This reflects the way 
the programme was poorly conceived, designed and implemented. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOREIGN AID, GRASSROOTS PARTICIPATION AND POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION IN TANZANIA: THE HESAWA FIASCO 
1.        Introduction 
"We commit ourselves to the goal of eradicating poverty in the world, through 
decisive national actions and international cooperation, as an ethical, social, 
political and economic imperative of mankind". 
Copenhagen Declaration, 1995 commitment #2 
Foreign aid is one of the major policy instruments of international cooperation, which, 
among other things, aims at transferring critical development-oriented resources from 
the North to the South.1 In more recent times, foreign aid has increasingly been 
targeted at fighting poverty reduction. As the opening quotation from the World 
Summit for Social Development aptly indicates, poverty reduction in the South is 
a collective international effort. In fact, both donor and recipient governments are 
agreed that, if prudently utilized, such resources would not only maximize economic 
growth, but also would improve the general welfare and alleviate pervasive poverty 
among the population. Why is it, then, that despite massive infusions of financial and 
technical assistance from the North, the economic, and social conditions in Sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly in Tanzania are dramatically worse off than they were 30 
years ago? Were economic development, poverty eradication or promotion 
democracy the overriding objectives of donor agencies and the recipient 
government in the first place? To what extent has foreign aid sought to address the real 
needs of the very poor in rural settings? These and similar questions structure and 
define the parameters of our study and analysis. 
In one of his seminal works, Resources, Values and Development, Professor 
Amartya Sen (1980) extensively elaborated on the concept of poverty. For him, and 
most scholars agree, poverty should be broadly understood as the lack of 
opportunity for an individual or group of people in society to achieve some 
minimally acceptable levels of basic life. These range from the most elementary 
aspects of life like proper nourishment, adequate clothing and shelter, avoidance of 
preventable morbidity to more complex social achievements such as taking part in 
the life of the community, being able to appear in public without shame and the ' 
1 In this study, trie term "North" is used as a shorthand description of the world's developed or industrialized countries; and the term 
"South" encompasses the less developed countries ranging from the oil-rich but non-industrialized members of the OPEC to the 
poorest and the least developed countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
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like. The opportunity of converting personal incomes into capabilities to function depends 
on a variety of personal circumstances (including age, gender, proneness to illness, 
disabilities and so on) and social surroundings (including epidemiological characteristics, 
physical and social environments, public services of health and education and so on). 
However, he warns us that proper policy interventions targeting the poor are more complex 
to design and time consuming to implement than most experts in business tend to 
imagine. 
Despite huge resource transfers to sub-Saharan Africa, only modest gains have been made 
in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. This is reflected in weak growth in the 
productive sectors, poor export performance, mounting debt, deterioration in social 
conditions, environmental degradation, and increasing decay in institutional capacity. Of the 
forty-seven countries classified by the UN as the least developed, no fewer than thirty-two 
are found in sub-Saharan Africa. Zambia, Zaire and Madagascar were added to the listjn. 
1992 by the UN General Assembly (Harsh, 1992). Moreover, the incidence and depth of 
poverty have been on the rise since the mid-1970s. It has been estimated that well over 50 
percent of its population lives in poverty. The World Bank (1993) predicted that given the 
region's exceptionally high population growth rates - over 3 percent a year - and low 
economic growth rates, as many as 100 million more Africans could be living in poverty by 
the end of this decade! Reflecting on this scenario, the 1997 Human Development Report 
concluded that "... in a global economy worth $25 trillion, this is a^scandjal..- reflecting 
shameful inequalities and inexcusable failure of national and international policy" (UNDP, 
1997:2). In a similar but cautious vein, an earlier World Bank Report (1990:127) had 
revealingly concluded, that "aid has done much less than might have been hoped to reduce 
poverty." The study to investigate the relationship between foreign and poverty reduction 
cannot therefore be more timely. 
The research report is divided into five substantive sections. The literature review is in 
section two. Section three presents the research problem and the objectives of the study. The 
background to the study is discussed in section four. Section five presents and discusses the 
research findings. The last section is the conclusion and recommendations. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 General Overview 
The end of the Cold War undermined the ideological, military and political foundations of 
the international order that had prevailed after the late 1940s, a period in which the concept 
of development co-operation emerged as a new incarnation of the Western idea of progress 
(Segasti, 1998). From the early 1990s, the imperatives of human solidarity, consolidation of 
democracy and poverty eradication are being paraded by the North as the emerging rationale 
for development co-operation in the new millennium. The recent World Bank thinking about 
poverty and poverty reduction in the South falls under the same ideological rubric. Since the 
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publication of the 1990 World Development Report, structural poverty reduction has 
once again been brought to the centre stage of development co-operation. It ushered in a 
new poverty agenda by articulating the importance of the policy reform to reduce 
poverty and provided the basis for a better aid strategy. In order to reduce poverty, 
the report recommended that external assistance should be more tightly linked to the 
assessment of the efforts that are being made by would-be recipients on the poverty 
reduction front (World Bank, 1990:iv). The report proposes three-pronged policy 
combinations. The first is the rekindling of economic growth. However, since the benefits 
of economic growth might fail to trickle-down, as has been the case previously, the report 
suggests that growth has to be labour-intensive in character, thus generating strong 
demand for labour. This emphasis in the new poverty agenda cautions governments 
against over-subsidizing capital, which leads to capital-for-labour substitution. However, 
it should be quickly pointed out that the key issue in this strategy is not to increase their 
labour intensity, but to raise returns to their labour. 
The second prong suggests a cnange iiMhe composition of public expenditures. The report 
further proposes that governments should help the poor by increasing the share of its 
expenditure that goes to education, nutrition, and health and by increasing the share of 
education and health spending that reaches the poor. In other words, how much does each 
dollar of public money contribute towards poverty reduction? The third prong is the 
provision of social safety nets, that is, special government schemes targeted on the poor who 
are unable to enter the labour market. This World Bank report has had profound impact on 
development cooperation in the 1990s. Poverty and poverty reduction particularly among 
the rural populations has become one of the primary organising principles in the aid 
process in the 1990s. Understandably, this novel development co-operation philosophy 
has recently been embraced by almost all major bilateral donors and recipients alike 
(Baulch, 1996" Sawada 1996).2 
While the components of the World Bank's strategy have some resemblance to the 
distribution with growth and basic needs strategies of the 1970s, the present strategy is 
geared much more toward private sector growth than was the case previously. Its underlying 
analysis rests on the assumption that widespread adoption of stabilization and structural 
adjustment measures will create a conducive climate for the private sector growth which 
will, in turn, provide self-advancement opportunities for the poor households through 
wage earnings and self employment (Cornia, et al. 1987). 
Much as there are general agreements in the literature as to the means to achieve 
significant poverty reduction, three disturbing differences of opinion remain. First, there 
are issues of questionable legitimacy of external agencies in determining sensitive policy 
agendas like the 
 
2 In 1993, for example, Baroness Lynda Chalker described reducing poverty as the "central" aim of the British  
aid program. Cited in Maxwell (1996:120). 
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anti-poverty crusade. Arguably, any effective implementation of a major domestic policy 
requires a well-planned mobilization campaign of key national actors and various competing 
political alignments. In this regard, only national governments have the capacity to mobilize 
various domestic constituencies. Moreover, Khothari (1993:152) makes similar arguments 
concerning the limitations of foreign actors in determining national agendas. He argues that 
foreign agencies can, in fact, influence, not determine, national political agendas. He further 
warns that: 
history has shown very clearly that one cannot constructively transform a 
society from outside. All genuine social transformations have been initiated 
from within the society, even though in many cases the genesis for such 
transformation lay in the cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences from 
different societies. 
Secondly, it is argued that a sensitive policy intervention like the anti-poverty agenda which 
is driven largely by international agencies such as the World Bank. UNICEF or UNDP is 
lacking on other important grounds. According to Toye and Jackson (1996:57) such a policy 
should be home grown and should command a broad national support. As the deprivation of 
particular groups gets politicised, they acquire a level of support far beyond what obtained 
earlier. In other words, enlightened politics and informed broad public discussions can play 
a unifying role in the anti-poverty agenda in any country. More specifically, they recommend 
that: 
...any international effort, like that of the World Bank to promote poverty 
reduction in particular countries must face up to the implications of one very 
central difficulty. It is perhaps not fully appreciated that the poverty 
reduction agenda has received high political priority in the now developed 
countries only at particular historical moments and under well-defined 
conditions. Research shows that the attitude of the elite was critical. They 
took action on the poverty alleviation issue because they shared a consensus 
around three beliefs. They were that (i) the welfare of the elite and the 
welfare of the poor were interdependent, and the elite was not able to 
insulate itself from the living conditions of the poor; (ii) the poor did, in fact, 
have the means to affect the welfare of the elite, principally by three 
methods namely crime, insurrection and epidemic disease; and, {Hi) some 
actions by the state would be efficacious in reducing the threat of the welfare 
of the elite posed by the behaviour of the poor. 
Thirdly and finally, the Bank prescription for a close integration of developing countries in 
the world markets, and the resulting benefits for the poor, are far from generally accepted. 
The instability of commodity prices, the weak market power of the poorer countries and the 
constraints on economic recovery imposed by onerous debt burdens do not auger well with 
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the Bank's poverty reduction strategy. Many concerned voices in South are crying for a re-
negotiation of selective modalities of integration or what is commonly called "strategic 
integration". This means essentially that countries and regional groupings in the South should 
be actively integrated to the extent and in the direction in which it is beneficial for them to 
do so (UNECA, 1989; South Centre, 1996). 
Not surprisingly, the role of foreign aid in poverty reduction is a contentious subject in 
development studies literature. One leading expert on the subject, Professor Chambers 
(1995) has warned us that reliable empirical analysis of the impact of poverty reduction of 
most aid programs is still in its infancy In this regard, this study should understood as a 
modest contribution to that goal. However, most of the aid-poverty debate in the literature 
has been dominated by two diametrically opposed positions. On the one hand, some writers 
have argued that foreign aid can contribute markedly toward poverty reduction in the South 
in at least four different ways. Firstly, by contributing indirectly to the overall growth of the 
economy, foreign aid can create more and better paying jobs, and increase the availability 
of goods and services consumed by the poor (Cassen et al., 1986).3 For example, the 
analysis of the household data for Java indicates that between 1984 and 1990, the 
proportion of its population living in poverty in rural Java dropped from 23.7 to 12.6 
percent, thanks largely to massive foreign aid, and sound macroeconomic and agricultural 
policies (World Bank, 1990; Mason, 1996). By the same token, in a span of exactly three 
decades (1960-1990), the East Asian region reduced its poverty from a third of its 
population to nearly one-tenth (Sandstrom, 1993:6-7). 
Secondly, by financing specific projects or sector outlays of particular relevance to the poor, 
like targeted agricultural research and extension (particularly for crops grown predominantly 
by the poor) or labor intensive public works, foreign aid can indirectly raise agricultural 
productivity, output, expand employment opportunities, and income levels for the poor 
(Mosley and Daha, 1985; Krueger and Ruttan, 1983). Thirdly, by investing in social 
infrastructure, foreign aid can channel benefits to the poor through affordable education, 
water, health and nutrition and family planning facilities. Above all, foreign aid can help 
promote critical processes of social and institutional engineering that are likely to benefit the 
poor like land reform (e.g in South Korea and Taiwan), or the recent donor demand for 
political democratisation and economic structural adjustment policies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Mukandawire, 1995; Chabal, 1992). 
On the other hand, there is growing evidence to suggest that, in fact, there is little or no 
direct correlation between the quantity of aid inflows to the South and the GDP growth 
rates let 
3 The idea of an international 1 percent aid target to poor countries had a counterpart target of 5 percent GDP 
growth rate in the recipient countries. For details see Singer (1970). 
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alone the rate of poverty reduction. Griffin and McKinley, the most acerbic critics  of development 
co-operation (1996:4) concluded that: 
...foreign aid has been a great disappointment to those who hoped that the end of the colonial 
era would usher in a new age of solidarity and cooperation between North and South. Looking 
back over four and a half decades of international economic assistance to the developing 
countries, it is clear that expectations of rapid and dramatic progress were too high, the economic 
analysis was faulty, and the political assumptions were simplistic. In short, the supporters of 
foreign aid were embarrassingly naive. 
. 
In a similar vein, one World Bank study (1990:128) concludes that "a clear link between aid and reduction 
of poverty has been hard to find". In a relatively similar vein, several studies have demonstrated that, all 
too often, foreign aid to the South has tended to strengthen the economic power of the already well to do in 
most of these societies while by-passing or even harming the very poor. Modeley study (1991) documents a 
depressing number of cases in which aid projects missed the poor due, for example, to insistence on 
literacy requirements, or even harm them through measures such as forced resettlement of the poor in 
order to generate electricity for the not-so-poor. 
Economic growth may increase the overall living standards substantially while failing to benefit the 
destitute and the poorest of the poor, who are often unable to undertake wage employment due to 
disability, infirmity, or the need to care for dependants. In a widely quoted study of seventy-four 
developing countries, Adelman and Morris (1973) concluded well over two decades ago that the economic 
growth and trickle-down theory was suspect: 
...thus, our findings strongly suggest that there are no automatic or even likely trickling down 
of the benefits of economic growth to the poorest segment of the population in low income 
countries. On the contrary, the absolute position of the poor tends to deteriorate as a 
consequence of economic growth (Adelman and Morris, 1973:189). 
Moreover, during the last decade or so, there has been growing concern about the role of foreign aid in 
alleviating poverty in the South. From the recipient side, there are documented complaints that aid 
delivery and administration is not only "donor driven". Furthermore, it is claimed that "hidden" donor 
self-interests abound. It is claimed that it is donors who conceive projects, design them, supervise their 
implementation and finally evaluate those projects according to some "preconceived criteria". Stokke 
(1983) has aptly shown that Norway and Denmark, for example, passed a legislation in the l«e 1970s 
intended to ensure that overseas, development assistance, especially grants, had a "return flow" in the 
form of' payments of goods and services from the donor country. The return flow of the overall 
Norwegian overseas development assistance increased from approximately 35 percent in 
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1978 to more than 50 percent in 1982. Viewed retrospectively, it can be argued that donors' 
commercial and other geostrategic interests took precedent over the stated objectives of 
economic development and poverty alleviation in the recipient countries. 
Many other studies have shown that rather than respond to the genuine needs of the South, 
donors have historically responded either to their security interest needs or to the needs of 
their home business constituency by securing markets, promoting exports, and creating a 
favourable climate for private foreign investment through foreign aid (Mushi, 1983; Griffin, 
1993; Rugumamu, 1997). Even more poignantly, Sir W. Arthur Lewis (1971:12) observed 
that "when you look at the table showing how much each of one hundred countries receive 
in foreign aid, it is a distribution which cannot be defended on any principle of need, size of 
population., absorptive capacity or any economic test. For example, at the end of the 1960s, 
the per capita aid to India on average was $2.10 a year, Liberia $21.50, and the global average 
was $5.50. Politics was the chief determinant of aid") With the conclusion of the Cold War, 
the emphasis on ideological questions may be gradually abating and the thrust of the 1990 
World Bank Report should therefore not be a surprise. 
Hard politics apart, blames and counter blames as well as fingure pointing in the aid process 
are as old as the industry itself. From their side, international development agencies have 
consistently complained about the virtual absence of credible national institutional 
frameworks in Africa through which to channel aid resources to the poor. It is often argued 
that eyen where such institutions were in place, they were either inadequately staffed, or 
simply out rightly corrupt. The often-stated argument is that foreign aid can only be as 
effective as the policies and institutional structures of the recipient. In this regard, the massive 
aid resource leakages from the poor to the rich are principally attributed to the recipients' 
rent-seeking behaviour. Ultimately, the pervasive institutional inadequacies in Africa are said 
to have forced some donor agencies to design projects and programs which were either 
inappropriately packaged, badly targeted or excessively lavish for the actual needs of the very 
poor (Mutahaba, 1989; Bossuyt et al, 1991). 
The plight of the poor people and their governments may also be explained by the 
insensitivity of some of the personnel in the aid bureaucracy. In a typical development co-
operation transaction, projects or programs are usually conceived and designed by 
international experts with the paraphernalia of pre-feasibility studies, feasibility studies, 
appraisal reports, specification of inputs and outputs, calculations of internal rates of 
return and sophisticated cost-benefit analysis. The poor people for whom all this is 
supposed to be done only exist in the abstract as numbers whose output and productivity are 
to be enhanced and whose needs have to be satisfied. Under this extreme yet a common 
scenario, the target population tends to be off-stage passively supplied with goods and 
services. As Sen (1995:11) perceptively argues,".. .not to focus on the fact that they (poor 
people) think, choose, act, and respond is to miss something terribly crucial to the entire 
exercise". In a similar vein, it is argued in this research report that one of the major 
contributing factors to the HESAWA 
 8 
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
project fiasco was precisely because the real needs and aspirations of the poor people were 
virtually unheard by those who purported to be helping them. 
Above all, the official misconceptions about foreign aid partly contributed to its 
ineffectiveness in poverty alleviation in several African countries. Aid resources are widely 
misconceived as "free gifts". Simply put, they are requested and usually accepted as costless 
development funds. Little wonder that the indirect costs usually linked to foreign aid are 
seldom considered let alone budgeted. In the case of industrial projects, a large proportion 
of the recurrent costs consists of imported intermediate inputs, particularly industrial raw 
materials and spare parts. For infrastructural projects and social service facilities, the 
government budget takes care of the operational and maintenance costs. In the end, foreign 
aid stretches government budgets beyond reasonable limits. As this study will demonstrate, 
in the wake of structural adjustment policies and the attendant cost sharing arrangement in 
the social sector, the cost of social services delivery and utilities like water in the HESAWA 
program became increasingly unbearable to the rural poor in Tanzania. 
It is the thesis of this report that one of the major reasons why foreign aid failed to alleviate 
poverty in many countries in the South was precisely because the real needs and aspirations 
of the poor were virtually ignored by those who purported to be helping them. The basic 
organising concepts such as consultation and participation remained virtually on paper at best 
or at the level of rhetoric at the worst. In reality, however, we argue that poverty reduction 
through participatory development is markedly different in approach, methodology and 
operation. Its central concern is with the development of the moral, intellectual, technical 
capabilities of individuals. A poverty-targeted program ought to be regarded as a deliberate 
and conscious process aimed at the expansion of those basic capabilities of individuals and 
society as a whole. 
 
By the late 1970s, donors and recipients alike came to the conclusion that the amount of 
foreign aid that had been disbursed was not commensurate with observable economic impact 
on the ground, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNECA, 1989; OECD, 1991). The 
professed objectives of building national capacities, promoting self-reliance and reducing 
poverty had remained largely elusive. At least in public, the blame for this apparent failure 
was shared equally between donors and recipient states. On the one hand, donors criticised 
themselves for having paid little attention to the recipients' macroeconomic and social 
conditions as well as glossing over the profound knowledge of recipient societies. They 
further faulted themselves for imposing universal explanations and solutions to entirely 
different problems in different environments. On the other hand, the recipient states were 
criticised for failing to define their real needs and for improperly managing the allotted 
resources (Cassen et al. 1986; Forss et al. 1990; Bossuyt et al. 1992). 
From the early 1980s, a consensus seemed to have emerged over possible reform measures 
to make foreign aid more effective, particularly in the areas of institutional capacity building 
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and poverty alleviation. In this regard, recipient states and their societies were called upon 
to take a lead role in assessing and planning their needs. It was assumed that such needs 
would, in turn, be linked to macro-level, sectoral and sub-sectoral strategies. The new 
thinking in aid delivery also called for the integration of technical and capital assistance with 
the view to transferring and developing competence on a sustainable basis. 
2.2. Foreign Aid and Poverty in Tanzania 
The evidence so far available on Tanzania provide virtually no direct causal relationship 
between the amount of aid received and economic growth or poverty alleviation. It has been 
estimated that between 1967 and 1998, for example, the government of Tanzania received 
well over $20 billion in external assistance, accounting for about 80 percent of all net official 
flows of external capital. In relative per capita terms, Tanzania's aid receipts have been 
comparatively modest. Over the 1980-95 period, for example, the average per capita official 
development assistance (ODA) for Tanzania hovered around $27, well below such countries 
such as Botswana ($82), Senegal ($51), and Zambia ($48), all of which benefited from a 
small country-low population effect (Mutahaba, 1989). However, relative to countries of 
comparative size and population, Tanzania was among the highest aid recipients in the world. 
More recently, during the 1990-93 period, Tanzania was ranked second only to Mozambique 
in its dependence upon development assistance from the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) countries and multilateral agencies. In spite of this massive aid flows, 
Tanzania is ranked the second poorest country in the world (Economic Intelligence Unit, 
1994: 132). 
If the amount of foreign aid received had any relationship with poverty reduction in Tanzania, 
then the latter should have long been eliminated! In fact, the Policy of Socialism and Self-
Reliance of the 1960s through the mid-1980s, had expressed the government commitment 
to spread the benefits of development fairly evenly among the masses and regions and to 
keep down income differentials. Paradoxically, the official policy and practice on 
poverty reduction and income distribution tended to push and pull in quite opposite 
directions. Poverty incidence is closely associated with the existent of income inequality. In 
recent years,-four different household surveys were conducted in Tanzania to establish 
income distribution. These are the Rural Household Survey conducted in September 1983, 
the Cornell/ERB Survey conducted in 1991/92, the Human Resource Development 
Survey conducted in October in 1993, and the Rural Participatory Poverty Assessment 
Survey conducted in 1995. All the four surveys concluded that income distribution in 
Tanzania was quite uneven. Based on the 1993 survey, the wealthiest 20 percent of 
Tanzanians controlled 45.4 percent of the total income, while the poorest 20 percent 
controlled only 6.8 percent. Moreover, all the four studies found income inequalities 
between urban and rural areas quite disheartening: while on average a rural Tanzanian 
spends an equivalent of $193 annually, his/her counterpart living in the capital city of Dar 
es Salaam spends on average $587 annually (World Bank., 1996:63). 
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Above all, during the early 1970s, Tanzania's social indicators were often equal to, if not 
above, the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the impact of misguided investment 
policies and uncontrolled aid dependence soon began to hit hard on the poor. The social 
sector which was recklessly expanded could no longer be sustained by domestic budgetary 
contributions. Slowly but inexorably, most of the gains that were recorded in the 1960s and 
the early 1970s were gradually wiped out. In short, foreign aid turned into an albatross around 
the neck of the poor masses. The major social indicators suggest that during the 1980s and 
thereafter, the overall social conditions of the poor in Tanzania stagnated or even declined 
compared to earlier years and indeed compared, to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Life 
expectancy, for example, remained the same for well over a decade; and the average daily 
calorie intake was slightly below its former level. Infant mortality in Tanzania by 1991 was 
well over 110 per thousand - one of the highest rates in the world. The most dramatic changes 
were the large decline in the primary school enrolment. From a situation in 1980 when the 
enrolment rate was 93 percent, significantly above the average for Sub-Saharan, it declined 
to 63 percent, well below the average for the sub-region (World Bank, 1993). 
3. Statement of Problem and Objectives 
3.1 General Overview 
As earlier noted, the 1990 World Development Report articulated the importance of policy 
reform to reduce poverty and provided the intellectual basis for a novel aid strategy. In order 
to reduce poverty, the report recommended that external assistance should be tightly linked 
to an assessment of the efforts that would-be recipients were making to reduce poverty 
(World Bank, 1990:iv). The aid-dependent government of Tanzania responded to this 
challenge by committing itself not only to growth-oriented policies but also to resolute efforts 
aimed at facilitating poverty reduction through the provision of basic social services and 
safety nets. With the help of external support, it has placed strong emphasis on resuscitating 
the provision of social services such as education, primary health care, nutrition and water 
supply to the poor (United Republic of Tanzania, 1994:15). 
This research set out to examine aid effectiveness in poverty alleviation in rural Tanzania. 
More specifically, it sought to investigate the impact of Health through Sanitation and Water 
(HESAWA) program on reducing poverty among the rural population. Although HESAWA's 
initial core objectives do not directly target poverty alleviation, its emphasis on the economic 
growth and social development in rural Tanzania presupposes poverty alleviation as an 
indirect final objective. As Addison (1996:26) perceptively observed "it is not untrue that 
growth in which the poor participate is ultimately necessary for substantial poverty 
reduction". From the early 1990s, the objectives of various development co-operation 
programs shifted in favour of poverty reduction and economic growth, influenced largely by 
the conclusion of the Cold War and the end of the double standards behaviour of the donor 
community. Indeed, economic growth is necessary not only for reducing poverty, but also for 
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preventing poverty from worsening. In this regard, the indirect relationship between foreign 
aid and economic growth, social development and poverty alleviation will be investigated. 
HESAWA is a program jointly financed by the governments of Tanzania and Sweden. It was 
launched in 1985. The project covers three regions of Kagera, Mwanza and Mara with a 
population of about 5 million people. Effective from 1994, the program operates in fourteen 
districts. According to Article 1 of the Program Cooperation Agreement, "the overriding 
objective of the HESAWA program is to improve the general health standards and to promote 
economic growth and social development among the poorer groups in rural areas." It is 
important to note that long before the World Bank re-invented its policy assault on poverty, 
Sweden had already shown the way. Moreover, by focusing on rural Tanzania, Sweden was 
convinced that rural inhabitants who rely as their main source of income on smallholder 
farming and traditional animal husbandry were far more likely than others to be poor. What 
Sweden lost sight of, and what the Government of Tanzania failed to raise was the basic fact 
that the rural dwellers were not homogeneous people. A more logical policy intervention, 
therefore, would have demanded the parties concerned to undertake comprehensive analysis 
on rural social differentiations, group targeting, and empowering strategies for the weak and 
excluded. . 
If, indeed, poverty alleviation has long been one of the indirect policy goal for giving and 
receiving aid, to what extent has this noble objective been achieved through the HESAWA 
program? Are those achievements, if any, sustainable? Has any hidden agenda on either side 
of the aid relationship derailed the declared program objectives? It was important to 
investigate whether or not the program was able to identify the rural poor, their strategic 
needs and how best to meet those identified needs. Quite often, projects which are targeted 
at the poor and disadvantaged, tend to be high-jacked by the local elites and benefit the better-
off even more (Collier et al. 1990). This otherwise skewed distribution of public goods is 
usually a function of the power structure and power relations obtaining on the ground. Have 
there been any discernible patterns of resource leakages to the non-poor sections of the 
population? To what extent has the recipient state and the beneficiary population been 
actively engaged in the management of this aid-supported project? These and other related 
questions framed the analysis and structured the arguments for the study. 
Unlike most previous impact studies, we found out that it was inadequate to evaluate aid 
effectiveness by simply focusing on official policy declarations. For purposes of this study, 
our theoretical construct strives to transcend this otherwise narrow focus. We postulate that 
the interests of the actors on both sides of the aid relationship have to be judged not by what 
their professed policies say, or by what pundits judge actors' interests ought to be, but rather 
by what their actions may have shown their interests to have been. We have inferred the 
interests of the actors in the HESAWA program from their actions and thereby explained to 
what extent foreign aid has served as an instrument of statecraft. 
 12
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
Moreover, previous aid impact studies virtually ignored the role and interests of the target 
population in the project design and management. If the justification of development is the 
well being of the people, then the decision-making power about their well-being should not 
be divorced from it. Beneficial decisions made on behalf of others cannot be guaranteed. The 
only guarantee is to enhance people participation in decision-making. For purposes of this 
study, participation is not simply construed as the mobilization of the rural people to 
undertake social and economic development projects in their respective villages. Rather, it 
is operationalized to mean a process of empowerment of the deprived and excluded. This 
broad view is based on the recognition of the differences that exist among different social 
groups and classes. Participation was interpreted to imply a strengthening of power of the 
deprived population in order to control their own destinies, improving their living conditions 
and opening up of their opportunities from below (Ghai, 1988). If beneficiary participation 
in decision-making is one of HESAWA's key organizing principles, to what extent have the 
poor sections of society been empowered and included in managing the program the last 
decade or so? 
Many African countries depend on donor funds for the execution of a substantial part of their 
capital projects especially rural water schemes. This is chiefly because most governments 
emphasize urban water and sanitation schemes and accord low priority to water supplies and 
sanitation to the poor, less vocal and politically sensitive rural communities. Donor agencies, 
on the other hand, tend to be more concerned not so much with the abject poverty on the 
ground, but rather with the quantum and return flow of their dollar assistance and diplomatic 
spin-offs. To what extent have the publicly declared objectives of giving and receiving aid 
been at variance with observable practices? 
Finally, the study sought also to determine the potential for the sustainability of the 
HESAWA program. The concept of sustainability was understood as the project's ability to 
deliver an appropriate level of services using the most cost-effective but socially acceptable 
means for an extended period of time after the major financial, managerial and technical 
assistance from the donor has been terminated or significantly reduced. This research 
objective was worth pursuing given the fact that Sweden, after ten years of continuous 
support, increased its annual financial contributions by more than 30 percent. Ideally, one 
would have expected the opposite (HESAWA Annual Review Report, 1994; 1998). 
3.2 Research Hypothesis 
This research was guided by one broad hypothesis. 
* If the target population, the government and donor agencies effectively participate in 
problem   identification   and   analysis,   project   design   and   planning,   project 
implementation and evaluation, then the net impact of the project on poverty alleviation 
is likely to be markedly enhanced.
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Hypothesis Explained: This research approached the community participation 
issues from the view that it is an integral part of the planning process, where 
resources are matched against needs and priorities are set accordingly. Furthermore, 
community participation is construed as the lead element in the provision of 
community social service because it makes it possible for communities to consider 
options and make commitments to a chosen strategy. Through community 
participation structures (government, donor agencies, and project managers) it is 
possible to facilitate the planning and implementation program using community 
priorities as the starting point. 
3.3 Coverage and Methodology 
As earlier pointed out, this project sought to study one of the major poverty alleviation aid-
supported projects in Tanzania. Given the fact that the poor in Tanzania, just as in other 
African countries, are mostly rural, we decided to study the effectiveness of aid in alleviating 
poverty in a rural setting. The study covered six districts and twelve villages in the two Lake 
Victoria regions of Mwanza and Kagera. 
' 
The traditional social science research methodology would have required one to construct a 
detailed questionnaire and administer it to a random sample of the universe whose 
perceptions one is attempting to capture, assess and analyze. However, by itself, this 
procedure was considered inadequate particularly when one is engaged in collecting and 
examining people's perceptions about their marginal living conditions, diffuse government 
policy on the subject, or even donor's hidden agenda. Predictably and almost invariably, one 
would expect bureaucrats as well as peasants to be overly secretive and defensive. To this 
effect, a great deal of data collected was largely dependent on less formalistic techniques. 
A structured questionnaire was supplemented by extensive documentary reviews and 
semi-structured interviews with key policy makers, analysts, opinion shapers and the targeted 
poor. 
The initial stage of the research drew heavily on secondary data. It included documentary 
reviews at selected government libraries in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza and at the donor 
agency offices. The exercise involved the examination and analysis of published and 
unpublished materials on the role of foreign aid in poverty alleviation in Tanzania. The 
information gathered gave clues on the nature of donor/government relations as well as donor 
perceptions, policies and strategies with regard to alleviating poverty in Tanzania. 
The second stage sought to collect primary data. The principal researcher and three research 
assistants administered the questionnaire on a carefully structured random sample of 1080 
households (440 males and 640 females) in six districts; 38 senior and middle-level 
administrators, 10 senior government officials, and 3 SIDA administrators in Mwanza and 
Dar es Salaam. The questionnaire was supplemented by interviews with principal poverty 
alleviation actors. The interviews were conducted by the principal investigator on a sample 
of twenty HESAWA officials in the regions. The interview schedule was kept loose. This 
 14
 
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
approach facilitated detailed discussions with government officials, donors and some target 
populations on the origins of policy initiatives, appraisals and the problems of 
implementation. Additionally, it allowed cross validation of responses with different 
interviewees. To ensure comparability and reliability of responses, an interview schedule of 
open-ended questions on major issues was addressed to all respondents in the same sequence. 
It involved carefully selected key informants from a cross-section of policy makers in 
government, political parties, non-governmental organizations, resident representatives of 
major donor institutions and the targeted poor people themselves. The purpose of the inquiry 
was to get a feel of their perceptions on poverty and poverty alleviation and what they 
considered to be the significance of the HESAWA project. Analysis of data was based on 
descriptive statistics and deductive reasoning. 
 
3.4 Significance of the Study 
The research output sought to offer both policy making and policy analysis communities 
opportunities to understand the factors that led to the success or failures of the HESAWA 
Program. The primary objective was to enhance awareness among policy makers of some of 
the consequences of aid conditionalities and cross-conditionalities as well as seek to improve 
their capabilities in negotiating and accepting demands; and reveal the imperative of 
community participation and gender sensitivities in the project/program design, 
implementation and evaluation. Another equally important objective of the study was to 
identify relevant training schemes in rural water technology essential for the understanding 
of similar projects/programs and establish appropriate policy environment and develop 
guidelines so as to minimise future project/program dependency and ensure financial and 
technology sustainability. 
 
4 Background to the Study 
 
4.1 Background to HESAWA Program 
The adoption of the Ujamaa Villages Policy in Tanzania in the early 1970s was partly in 
recognition of the complex problems that the Government had experienced in providing 
social services to scattered populations in the rural areas. The 1967 Policy of Socialism and 
Self-Reliance sought to bring health, schools and water facilities closer to the people. 
Moreover, polluted water resulting from .poor sanitation is often closely linked with 
communicable diseases in the world over, and tackling this problem is a major strategy in the 
promotion of good health. According to the World Health Organization estimates, 
approximately 80 percent of all diseases are partly linked to inadequate water and poor 
sanitation. It is precisely because of this realization that the Government of Tanzania gave 
top priority to rural water supply. 
The rural drinking water supply came high on the national agenda in Tanzania in 1971 when 
the then ruling party, TANU, declared that by 1991 all rural households should have access 
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to clean, safe and adequate water with easy reach of their homes. Under the policy of 
Socialism and Self-Reliance water was regarded as one of the basic needs which should be 
provided freely by the Government. The Government's policies regarding the war on poverty, 
ignorance and disease received a lot of sympathy from Western and socialist governments 
alike. Within 15 years of the water-for-all policy, donor agencies contributed about two-thirds 
of the total capital expenditure for the rural water sector development. From 1974 to 1978, 
for example, the Dutch through their DHV Company, financed the construction of 714 hand-
pumped wells in Shinyanga region. Finland under FINIDA through the Finwater Company, 
constructed more than 1,700 wells in Lindi and Mtwara regions between 1971 and 1983. 
Denmark through DANIDA covered Iringa, Mbeya and Ruvuma regions. Sweden through 
SIDA covered Mwanza, Mara and Kagera regions. Norway through NORAD covered 
Kigoma and Rukwa (Therkildsen, 1988). 
Following the inadequate performance in water supply during the International Drinking 
Water and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) of 1981 -1991, the free water-for all by 1991 target 
had become elusive. Free water for all was perceived as bad economics and bad politics and 
hence not sustainable. Under the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policy packages of 
the 1980s, social services like water, education and medical services were no longer to be 
provided for free. Beneficiaries were required to contribute in cash and/or kind towards new 
investment financing and in sustaining the existing schemes. From then onwards, these social 
services became commercial rather than free public goods. This gave the context for the 1991 
National Water Policy. The new policy promised that portable water in sufficient quantities 
would be made available to within 400-meters of every household by the year 2002 and that 
the running costs and expansion costs should be self-financed through the collection of water 
charges. It added that "it is necessary to motivate and involve the people in planning, 
construction, operation and maintenance activities of water schemes if they are to regard 
these schemes as theirs" (URT, 1991). Surprisingly and without serious sector studies, the 
target was shifted to 2002.4 
At the operational level, the new National Water Policy recommended the establishment 
of Village Water Committees and Water Funds. In one major study, the Ministry of 
Community Development, Women and Children found that water in the homes was fetched 
generally by the women folk (75 percent) and children (20 percent), with men accounting 
for a mere 5 percent (Ministry of Community Development, Women and Children, 1988). 
This official awareness made the Government to issue directive that technical solutions 
in the water 
 
4 According to tne 1995 estimates of the Water and Sanitation Sector Review, the national water 
coverage at the end of 2002 was likely to be around only 49 percent. This was based on the assumption that 
all the existing wells will continue being operational, that the funding remains constant; and that the annual 
population growth rate remains at 2.8 percent (Ministry of Water and Energy, 1995). 
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programs should take into consideration the needs and priorities of women and secure women 
participation in all aspects of the program. The government streamlined its sensitisation 
policy especially for men on the importance of ensuring that water programs meet women's 
needs, and how labor demands on women and their social welfare are affected by the 
provision of safe water at reasonable distances. Each village was to create a Water Committee 
and operate its water fund. Fifty percent of the committee members were to be women. This 
meant that development aid beneficiaries were the owners of the project, who managed its 
operation bore the costs thereof. 
In addition the Water Policy was the National Health Policy. Both these policies were 
expected to re-enforce each other in order to enhance public health. The National Health 
Policy stipulated that each and every household should have a functioning latrine. It also 
required all public buildings (schools, dispensaries etc) to construct institutional latrines. 
Above all, critical environmental concerns were given prominence in the planning of 
sustainable development programs. Water supply and sanitation program had to take into 
account the increasing pressure on water resources and the impact this was likely to have on 
the environment. The existing sources of water were to be safeguarded through 
environmentally sound planning strategies, and the water programs had to identify strategies 
which communities would undertake to sustain them. Improved environmental management 
would ultimately ensure the survival of the^water catchments areas for the present and future 
generations. 
4.2 Swedish Aid to Water Sector 
Swedish assistance to the rural water sector in Tanzania started in the mid-1960s. From 1965 
to 1984, for example, the water sector program represented about 48 percent of Swedish 
disbursements to rural development and agriculture. In the early 1970s, as much as 80 percent 
of the overall resources used for rural water supply in the country were contributed by 
Sweden. Later, other donors started to operate in the sector, and from the mid-1970s to the 
early 1980s, the Swedish share of the total capital investment in the sector gradually fell to 
about 30 percent (Adam et al. 1994:34-36). Swedish assistance has traditionally been the 
provision of funds, supply of equipment, and materials as well as technical assistance. The 
technical assistance given through consultants has provided professional advise and support 
in the fields of human resources development, promotion of integrated activities, technical 
advice on water supply, operation and maintenance, information communication and 
monitoring. It has also assisted in the procurement process of goods and materials 
distribution, cost control and financial management and reporting methodologies to 
respective Ministries and to SIDA. 
' 
However, according to Radetzki (1986), SIDA-supported water projects in Tanzania came 
increasingly under attack by the end of the 1970s. Most of the water projects were found to 
be too expensive to complete, had faulty technical designs and inappropriate technology; and 
unsustainable as the target beneficiaries could not afford the energy intensive systems given 
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the annual government subventions which were chronically inadequate. Furthermore, lack 
of recipient participation and ownership led to frequent vandalization of the facilities. From 
the early 1980s, SIDA support to the water sector was scaled down to only three Lake 
Victoria regions. The modality of aid delivery was also changed and an integrated rural water 
supply, health education and environmental health program initiated. The new modality 
emphasized user participation and the utilization of less sophisticated and affordable water 
technologies.
Since the early 1980s, major re-orientations in the thinking of social services provision 
occurred. The HESAWA Program was a result of this thinking. The program was launched 
in 1985 when the governments of Tanzania and Sweden entered into the first Specific 
Agreement on cooperation concerning rural water supply, environmental sanitation and 
health education. The program covers the Kagera, Mara and Mwanza regions of Tanzania 
bordering Lake Victoria. As of December 1995, about 600 villages and approximately 1 
million people had, in one way or another, benefited from the program. Two more agreements 
were subsequently signed. The third four-year agreement was scheduled to end in June 1998.
4.3 Program Organizational Structure
The program is implemented by the Government of Tanzania of which the Ministry of 
Community Development, Women Affairs and Children is the lead Ministry. Other 
ministries, namely, those responsible for Water, Health, Finance, the Prime Minister's Office 
and the Planning Commission are involved in the program implementation, primarily through 
their regional and district structures. The HESAWA Director's office at the lead Ministry of 
Community Development, Women Affairs and Children develops operational concepts, 
principles of the program and action plans for the regions and districts as well as co-
ordinating activities under the program. The Ministry is also responsible for mobilizing 
resources from the government and donors and prepares terms of reference and tendering of 
activities for consulting services. Above all, it undertakes networking between key 
stakeholders and training institutions and other supportive institutions.
The Zonal Coordinating office is located in Mwanza headed by the HESAWA Deputy 
Director. In the past the program was implemented under the office of the Prime Minister and 
First Vice President, which is also in charge of regions and Districts. However, given the 
present organizational set up, the HESAWA Deputy Director reports to the HESAWA 
Program Director in the Ministry of Community Development, Women Affairs and Children. 
The role of the Zonal Office is to offer overall coordination and control of SIDA resources, 
planning and management of the program, monitoring, logistics and maintenance of the 
program facilities, plants and vehicles. Furthermore, the office establishes regular technical 
and professional contacts with the regional and district HESAWA coordination offices.
At the regional level, the Regional Development Director (RDD) used to be the accounting 
officer who oversaw HESAWA funds and materials. Each of the three regions has a Regional
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Hesawa Coordinating office, headed by a Regional HESAWA Coordinator, all government 
officials who report to the Regional Development Director. In addition, non-government 
staff, e.g Regional HESAWA advisor and Regional HESAWA accountant, are attached to the 
Regional HESAWA coordination office. The office has a monitoring, advisory and 
supportive role to the districts. 
At the district level, the District Executive Directors act as HESAWA accounting officers to 
their respective councils. The District HESAWA office, headed By the District HESAWA 
Coordinator coordinates the program in the district. Other key players at this level include the 
District Water Engineer, District Health Officer and the District Community Development 
Officer. In executing their duties they work closely with the Ward Development Committees, 
and the Village Hesawa Committees. 
At the very bottom of the HESAWA Program hierarchy is the village-level coordination. 
Villagers elect a Village Council of 23, then sets up various committees, with five members 
each, to cover Finance and Planning, Social Services, Security and Production. Village 
Councils are also empowered to set up necessary committees to handle issues deemed 
important for such a structure. Some villages have a Village Health Worker and a Community 
Development Assistant to assist the village with technical issues. In some cases there is a 
Traditional Birth Attendant and a water attendant. Water programs and water funds are 
managed by the Village HESAWA Committee. Their day-to-day duties include the 
mobilization of their respective communities to ensure that water systems are properly and 
efficiently operated and maintained. This includes resource mobilization, and preventive 
maintenance like bolt tightening, greasing, inspection campaign against vandalism and the 
like. 
The Village HESAWA Committee is the most important organ in the day-to-day management 
of the HESAWA Program. It is a 5-person committee responsible for the overall management 
and control of all water systems in phased-out villages. The Committee is comprised of a 
village fundi, pump attendant, pump mechanic, village health worker, traditional birth 
attendant and a well point caretaker. It is specifically mandated to oversee the management 
of the Village HESAWA Account- which finances the preventive and corrective maintenance 
of the water facilities in respective villages. On the average, the study found out that most 
village committees members possessed little technical knowledge about how to keep books, 
ensure accountability or regularly communicate to members on the financial position or 
technical problems facing their respective communities. Village HESAWA Committees are 
ultimately accountable to village governments. It is important to emphasize at this juncture 
that serving on this committee is essentially a community service activity (Munuo, 1992; 
HESAWA Internal Reports). 
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4.4 Program Planning and Implementation 
According to the HESAWA guiding principles, planning and implementation of any project 
shall be the responsibility of the villages. In theory, the HESAWA program should originate 
from the village level and work its way up through the system via the ward, district and 
region to the zonal office. Although villages prepare annual plans and pass them through the 
system, the final plans.are said to bear little real relationship to the needs originally expressed 
at the village level. This anomaly is alleged to originate from a limited resource capacity or 
even over-optimistic planning at the village, ward and district levels. In practice, the decision 
over HESAWA plans is the responsibility of the Annual Review Meeting and in operational 
terms with the National Directorate ^and zonal coordination office, which have major 
influence on budgetary allocations. HESAWA's laid down planning procedures are thus not 
strictly adhered to. They did not serve as a vehicle for empowering the poor and excluded in 
the rural setting of Tanzania. 
In order to facilitate village involvement, the District Executive Director's office is 
responsible for planning, budgeting, implementation and coordination of HESAWA 
activities. Since the early 1990s, HESAWA activities at the District level have been largely 
integrated into the Government structure. The District authorities have taken over most of the 
planning and implementation roles which were formerly carried out by the Zonal Office in 
Mwanza and its consultants. These roles include promotion, construction of facilities, 
facilitation of human resources development activities, procurement of locally available 
materials, maintenance of the program vehicles, and the administration of funds for major 
HESAWA activities at district level. 
Water supply and sanitation needs are identified by the Districts in collaboration with 
respective villages. Once a village has been brought into the HESAWA program, they are 
expected to constitute a relevant HESAWA Committee and open a HESAWA Bank Account. 
As for the water provision, once installed, they are maintained by the district for one year 
after completion, and then handed over to the village. The village is then expected to take 
care of most of the operations and maintenance, using funds from its HESAWA Bank 
Account to meet the necessary expenses. Training and human resources development 
program of HESAWA is expected to prepare respective committees to execute such technical 
duties. 
The program's technical activities are accompanied by a broad program of human resource 
development and health and hygiene education. The training programs are carried out in 
terms of workshops, seminars, courses and meetings. Such activities include support to and 
training of village HESAWA Committees, Village Health Workers (VHWs); and traditional 
birth attendants (TBAs). These village workers help to promote improved health and hygiene 
practices, household and institutional latrine building programs, and the formulation of 
village study groups to encourage self-help activities. Whenever local technical inputs fell 
short, SIDA brought in foreign technical assistance to perform routine gap-filling exercises. 
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The main concern, however, is the level of consultation that took place between these foreijp 
agencies and the beneficiary population in the rural areas. 
The Regional Water Master Plans for the Lake Regions, for example, were prepared t» 
Brokonsult, a Swedish branch of an American-owned company. The work was carried ofl 
from 1975 to 1977. Sixteen expatriates from nine different professions participated durii| 
various periods of the preparation. Five counterpart engineers from the Ministry of Wa» 
were assigned to the expatriate team. The team operated from Mwanza, independently of tk 
authorities in the three regions with whom no formal links were established. Worse still, tha 
was no coordination with the concurrent rural integrated development planning team whid 
worked in Mwanza from 1974 to 1976. The Company terminated the contract with SID! 
before it worked on the implementation plan. SIDA contracted VIAK Company, anotki 
Swedish consultant to prepare an implementation plan for the three regions. Many of 4 
VIAK proposals were amended by the Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA) at a 
University of Dar es Salaam which came to form the operational philosophy for HESAWI 
Shallow wells, participation and management were the key concepts in the noi 
implementation plan (Therkildsen, 1988:106). 
Out of the total HESAWA program budget, the governments of Tanzania and Sweden agreed 
to contribute initially an approximate ratio of 1:10. All the recurrent costs, includa 
operation and maintenance and all other resources such as the necessary staff and fuel woi be 
financed by Tanzania. Sweden, through SIDA, supplies foreign funds needed for materirf and 
equipment, technical support through experts and logistical support. As Table 1 bela 
indicates, the overall Swedish investment in the HESAWA project is estimated at SKR. 893 
million. 
According to Swedish-Tanzania development cooperation agreement, the government i 
Tanzania, the beneficiary local governments and the target population were expectedl 
contribute 10 percent of the value of total donor funds. The Central Government contribute 
were calculated directly from annual budgetary allocations to respective regions and distri^ 
From the initial estimates that were made in the early 1990s, they indicated that govern™ 
budgetary contributions to the three HESAWA regions amounted to about Tshs. 100 mill or 
about SEK 2.5 million, representing about 6.6 percent of the annual Swedish contributicl In 
addition, during the same period, it was estimated that respective District Couni 
contributed about Tshs. 11 million, representing about 0.7 percent of the total project fund! 
Thus, the total matching contributions from the Central and Local governments to I 
HESAWA program was about 7.3 percent of the donor funds.5 
5. These figures exclude community contributions (financial or otherwise) which are, for f 
obvious reasons difficult to quantify. Worse still, most Village HESAWA Accounts are pof 
managed. Above all, users' contributions in terms of labor, time and materials are hardly costed. 
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Table 1: SIDA Disbursement to Tanzania Rural W.ater Supply 
(in mill. SEK) 
 
 
Year Disbursements 
1966-67 5.9
1967/68 4.2 
1968/69 7.1
1969/70 18.2 
1970/71 12.9
1971/72 24.3 
1972/73 26.0
T973/74 32.2 
1974/75 22.0
1975/76 62.5 
1976/77 39.0
1977/78 49.0 
1978/79 45.0
1979/80 32.1 
1980/81 12.1
1981/82 30.4 
1982/83 26.6
1983/84 34.6 
1984/85 39.2
1985/86 33.3 
1986/87 30.8
1987/88 31.6 
1988/89 38.5
1989/90 37.9 
1990/91 31.4
1991/92 27.8 
1992/93 36.0
1993/94 38.2 
1994/95 50.0
1995/96 50.0 
1996/97 50.0 
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4.5 Program Objectives 
According to Article 1 of the Specific Agreement, the overriding goal of the program is to 
improve the general health standards and to promote economic growth and social 
development among the poorer groups in rural areas. However, since the early 1990s, the 
HESAWA program objectives, like all other development cooperation programs, have 
emphasized poverty reduction in developing countries as one of the benchmarks 
against which their performance should be judged. The old objectives of HESAWA 
included water supply programs,  improved health education,  environmental 
sanitation,  community participation, capability and capacity building at village, ward, 
and district levels. The program implementation assumed active community 
participation by women and men, in decision-making, planning and implementation. The 
program activities are based on user-ownership concepts of affordability, 
sustainability, replicability, credibility and costl efficiency. 
To the largest extent possible, activities started with the program will rely on the local 
resource base. In many cases, investment costs will be shared, but in all cases, communities 
will be fully responsible for management, financing, operation and maintenance of thcB 
facilities after completion. The main operational objectives are: 
(a) Provision of reliable water supply systems which are easily accessible and with water of I 
satisfactory quality and quantity; 
(b) Provision of better water use and hygiene through health education and 
community" 
participation; 
(c) Promotion of improved environmental sanitation by more and better latrines, drainage.  
vector control and waste water disposal system; 
(d) provision of human resource development and capacity building, institutional support in 
areas such as middle-level management; and this done by: 
 
• providing overall promotion and human resources development; 
• assimilating Local Government Acts at village level; 
• imparting technical skills, at village and other levels; 
• improving managerial aspects in particular at district, ward and village levels; 
• increasing gender awareness at all levels. 
4.6 Overall Progress: Water 
The progress in the physical implementation of the relevant technical systems and huma 
capacity development are the best measurable outputs of the HESAWA program. There has 
been marked improvements in the water supply technologies developed by HESAWA. These 
include, among others, shallow wells with^ither electric or hand pump; improved traditional 
water sources in most cases wells but to a lesser extent springs; institutional and household 
rain water harvesting; and where appropriate or affordable, gravity and other piped water 
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schemes with stand posts known as water posts.6 The water service level is commonly 
expressed as a number of people sharing a water post or as a maximum walking distance 
between a post and the homes of the users. In principle, the Tanzania design standard 
stipulates a maximum distance of 400 meters. 
The quantitative achievement in the construction of the water schemes from 1985 to 1996 
are given in Table 2. A total 5,085 community water supply systems have been constructed in 
the three regions. If they were all functional, they would theoretically supply water to 
about 1.3 million people. However, due to frequent breakdowns, low yields, or simply 
dried-up wells, the effective number of people supplied is about 900,000, or about 18 
percent of the total estimated 5 million people in the three regions. 
Table 2: Progress Implementation Statistics: Water 1985/86 to 1995/96 
Region   HD  DW  MD  REH   PN  PR  DPs   ITWS   RHH   RI   WJ 
Kagera    233   200    116     39      27     4     894      365       125     49    475 
Mwanza  0  1333   146    332     3      1     38      346         9      41  181 
Mara          0   509      36       8       10      2     157       343          5       22    250 
Total     233 2042    298    369    40     7   1089     1054     139    112   906 
 
Key 
HD = hand-drilled 
DW= dug well 
MD= machine drilled 
REH= rehabilitated well 
PN= piped supplies new 
PR= piped supplies rehabilitated 
DP= domestic point 
ITWS= improved traditional wells 
RHH= rainwater harvesting at household 
WJ= water jar 
Source: HESAWA Evaluation Report (draft) 1996 Table 1 p.6 
4.7 Sanitation and Human Resources Development 
The main objective of improved water supply systems is to reduce the 
incidence of diseases. Diseases associated with contaminated water 
supplies include chorela, schistomaniasis, 
 
 
6 A gravity scheme is where water flows by gravity from rivers and streams to lower lying villages; a 
piped scheme is where diesel pumps are used to lift the ground water and hand pumps schemes are those 
where shallow ground water is a source and hand pumps are used to lift the water. 
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typhoid, dysentery and hepatitis. However, the health benefits of a clean water supply 
depends on what health education and sanitation programs can accomplish. A clean water 
supply is useful, but insufficient to improve health by itself. Evidence abound to suggest that 
the health benefits of a clean water supply increase substantially when combined with user 
health education. This logic explains why the HESAWA Program integrates water supply 
with sanitation education. 
As stipulated in the National Health Policy, each and every household shall have a 
functioning latrine and all public buildings (schools, dispensaries etc) shall have institutional 
latrines. The primary emphasis in the sanitation component of the HESAWA program is the 
introduction of improved, but affordable, household and institutional latrines. The major goal 
of a latrine program is to remove the disposal of human excreta from human contact. It is also 
intended to cover other issues such as waste disposal, drainage, protection of domestic waste 
points, personal hygiene and control of vector related diseases. Most traditional latrines, 
particularly in Mara and Mwanza regions were unimproved and badly constructed. Squat 
holes were little more than large openings, sometimes covered with poles but most of those 
appear to be quite dangerous especially for children. Shelters are commonly built with very 
light materials with neither windows nor doors. Cleanliness is generally poor. Frequently 
there are faeces on the floor and many flies around. As Table 3 shows, some efforts towards 
addressing this problem have been made. By 1995, a total of 476 institutional latrines and 
9,083 household latrines had been built under the HESAWA support (HESAWA Annual 
Reports). 
HESAWA's solution to this problem was the introduction of the Ventilated Improved Pit 
(VIP) latrines. The program introduced a scheme of constructing and selling concrete 
squatting slabs. It was calculated that the material inputs into the latrine slab \\ as about Tshs. 
6,000 (1995 prices), of which the beneficiary was required to contribute Tshs. 1.500 and then 
cover the reminder of the cost by providing labour (for pit digging, lining, superstructure 
construction and chimney). The VIP latrines have proved ineffective and of only limited 
relevance to the perceived needs of the rural poor. The cost was considered too high, and the 
priority for high quality latrines too low compared to the need for improving their low-cost 
houses. 
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Table 3:  Progress Implementation Statistics: Sanitation and Human                                
Resource Development 
 
Region LI LHH VHW TBA WDP VF PA PM WS 
KAGERA 105 2853 412 37 1067 423 2 6 0 
MWANZA 230 4679 570 301 2384 753 258 41 70 
MARA 141 1551 342 212 702 294 11 23 28 
TOTAL 476 9083 1324 550 4153 1470 271 70 98 
Key 
LI = institutional latrines  
LHH = household latrines  
YH\V = village health worker 
TBA = traditional birth attendant 
VDP = well point caretaker  
VF = village fundi  
PA = pump attendant  
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PM = pump mechanic   
VS = washing slab 
Source. HESAWA Report (1995). 
The HESAWA program embarked on building and strengthening human resource capacities 
at all levels in the three respective regions. Being informed or creating awareness is the first 
condition for participation and ownership. By the end of 1996, more than 4,200 village 
leaders, councilors and senior district staff in the three regions had attended HESAWA 
promotion meetings, workshops on the HESAWA concept and gender awareness. Moreover, 
as Table 3 indicates, all the critical categories of local "experts" had been trained. At the ward 
level, capacity building included the training of Community Development Assistants. At 
village level, it included the training of care takers, fundis, village health officers and 
traditional birth attendants. 
5. Research Findings and Analysis 
5.1 General Overview 
To capture poverty in a rural setting in Tanzania, we found out that by only looking at 
aggregated income data as a sole measurement of poverty may obscure the misery of the 
peoples' lives. Even if more detailed statistics were available on income, they would not, 
alone, be a sufficient indicator of economic status due to the largely subsistence nature of 
rural societies. Many, and probably most transactions still take place outside the formal 
market sector, goods are battered between households and are not exchanged for cash. 
Outside major towns, incomes could not therefore be used as a poverty indicator without 
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additional reference to material assets such as the quality of houses, size of households, 
quality of toilets or rights to land. To capture poverty under those conditions, we used a rapid 
wealth ranking methodology to categorize peasants into" rich", "middle" and "poor" by 
aggregating and weighing indices such as levels of education, number of children per 
household as well as types of houses and latrines. 
5.2 Characteristics of Sample Population 
The majority (64 percent) of those interviewed in the twelve villages visited were in the 
active age population range, that is between 15 and 45 years. Moreover, about sixty per cent 
of the interviewees were female while forty percent were males. 98 percent of the respondents 
to the questionnaire were farmers, among them 78 percent were categorized as poor, 20 
percent as "middle" farmers and 2 percent as "rich" farmers. More than a quarter (28 percent) 
of sampled households were female-headed. Moreover, well over a third (36 percent) of poor 
farmer-households in the sample were female headed. This was purposely done in order to 
capture not only the predominance of women in the use of household water, but most 
importantly, to underscore HESAWA's explicit bias for poor rural women as its specific 
target group. As earlier studies pointed out, water in the homes was generally fetched by the 
women folk (75 percent) and children (20 percent) with men accounting for a mere 5 percent 
(Ministry of Community Development, 1988). In this regard, technical problems, their 
solutions and otherwise in any water program should, in essence, take cognisance of both 
their practical gender needs and their strategic gender needs.7 Tables 4 to 10 provide this 
information. 
Table 4: Age Characteristics of the Interviewees 
 
 26
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Field Work File (1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Practical gender needs have to do with what people need in order to perform their current roles 
easily, effectively and efficiently and these can be identified by the people themselves. Women 
strategic needs are concerned with changing positions of women through policies and legislation to 
enhance equity and equal opportunity. 
Age Group No. of People % of Total 
15-30 years 290 27
31-45 years 400 37 
46-60 years 200 19
over 61 190 17 
Total 1080 100
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Table: 5 Gender Composition of Interviewees 
  
 
No. of persons Percentage 
Male            432 40
Female        648 60 
Total           1080 100 
Source: Field Work File (1998). 
The overall level of formal education of the interviewees was generally low. About 10 
percent of the sampled population had never attended school and nobody had done post-
secondary education or any professional training. Well over one-third (35 percent) had not 
completed primary education. Only about 51 percent had-completed primary education. The 
remaining 4 percent had completed Form Four. The low level of education attainment is 
usually associated with poverty and it is considered as one of the hindrances to upward 
mobility. 
Table 6: Education Level of the Population 
 
Level of Education No. of People % of Total 
Ne\ er went to school 108 10 
2. Did not complete Primary Education 378 35 
Completed Primary Education 552 51 
4. Completed Form IV 42 4 
5. Went to post- Secondary Education 0 0 
Total 1080 100 
 
Source: File Work File (1998). 
Most households in the sample showed an overwhelming tendency to have large families. 
Well over eighty percent of our respondents had four children and above with short birth 
intervals. Thirty two percent of the respondents had six children. Twenty eight percent had 
six children. Under normal circumstances, poor people are generally associated with many 
children who are in turn considered as an insurance in old age. 
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Table 7: Number of Children per household 
 
No. of children No. of Respondents % of Respondents 
no children 22 2
1 child 40 4 
2 children 70 6
3 children 80 7 
4 children 90 8
5 children 200 19
6 children 300 28
7 children 350 32
8 children 40 4 
Total 1080 100 
Source: Field Work File (1998). 
Table 8: Types of Houses of Interviewees 
 
Building member Type of Materials No. of people % of Total 
(i) walls Poles and mud 392 36 
 Burnt bricks 208 19 
 Masonry 120 11 
 Grass 312 58 
 Not stated 70 6 
 Total 1080 100 
(ii) roofs Corrugated iron sheets 400 37 
 Thatch 710 56 
 Not stated "0 6 
(iii) floor Compacted earth "90 73 
 Cement and sand screed 280 26 
 Not stated 10 1 
 Total 1080 100 
Source: Field Work File (1998). 
The condition of most of the respondents' houses was generally unsatisfactory. Although 
well over one third of the houses had corrugated iron sheets, on the whole the condition of 
the houses was poor. The overwhelming number of the houses was thatched with tin sheets 
and grass thatch. Less than a quarter of the houses in the sample had walls made of bricks, 
stone or concrete. Well over fifty percent of the houses had walls constructed out of wood 
and mud. Moreover, over 73 percent of the houses had earth floors, a potential breeding 
ground for all kinds of diseases. Only about a quarter of the houses had cement floors and 
tiles. Above all,  
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about 65 percent of all houses in our sample were constructed on a non-permanent basis. 
This situation was partly because of generalized poverty in rural Tanzania and partly 
because of semi-nomadic way of life in some parts of Mwanza region. 
Table 9: Types of Latrines in Sampled Villages 
 
Type No. of Toilets % of Total 
1. pit latrines 
   (unroofed) 590 55 
2. pit latrines roofed 130 12 
3. ventilated pits 175 16
4. no toilets 182 17 
5. inside house toilets        3 0
 1080 100 
 
Source: Field Work File (1998). 
The general condition of the toilets, like that of houses was poor. Less than one percent of 
the households had in-house flush toilets. All the remaining households had outside pit 
toilets. 67 percent of all toilets were unimproved, often uncompleted and flimsily built with 
coverless pit latrines. Squat holes were little more than large openings, sometimes covered 
with poles, and many appeared to be quite dangerous, especially for children. Shelters 
were often built with very light materials, without roof or doors. Cleanliness was generally 
poor and flies were not uncommon. About 17 percent of the population interviewed had 
no toilets at all. Only about 16 percent of the people interviewed had constructed and 
adopted HESAWA-sponsored "ventilated improved pits" (VIPs) latrines, based on the sale 
and distribution of concrete slabs. As earlier noted, the costs were considered too high even 
at heavily subsidized price and the priority for such high quality latrines was too low 
among poor rural peasants. The overwhelming use of crudely constructed, and poorly 
kept pit latrines is yet another indicator of pervasive poverty in rural Tanzania. 
5.3 Research Findings and Analysis 
5.3.1 General Overview 
As with poverty, the concept of participation I s often contentious in the social science 
literature.8 One common usage of the concept refers to "mobilization" of people to 
undertake social and economic development projects or programs. Typically, the projects 
are conceived and designed from above and the people are mobilized to implement them. 
Their participation 
 29
8 The definition and specification of participation have heavily borrowed from Dharam 
Ghai's (1988) seminal paper on participatory development. 
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may be in form of contribution of labour and materials, either free or paid for by the 
authorities. The distribution of benefits from such a project would depend on a variety of 
factors such as the patterns of ownership of productive resources, distribution of political 
power among social groups or the nature of the project. 
The second interpretation equates participation with decentralization of governmental 
machinery or decentralization of power in related organizations. Resources and decision-
making powers may be transferred to lower level organs, such as local officials, elected 
bodies at the village or local project committees. While this may enhance local-level 
decisions on the choice, design, and implementation of the development activities, there is no 
guarantee that this need imply any meaningful participation by the rural masses. Indeed, 
the distribution of economic and political power at local levels in many countries is such 
that decentralization results in allocation of resources and choice of development activities 
which are less beneficial to the poor than when such decisions are taken at the central level. 
The third view of participation regards it as a process of empow cnneat of die deprived 
and excluded. This view is based on the recognition of differences in political and economic 
power among different social groups and classes. Participation is interpreted to imply 
strengthening of the power of the masses. Its three elements have been defined as "sharing 
of power and scarce resources, deliberate efforts by social groups to control their own 
destinies and improve their living conditions, and opening up of opportunities from below. 
Participation in this sense necessitates the creation of organizations of the poor which are 
democratic, independent, and self-reliant" (Ghai, 1988). 
5.3.2 Participation: Whose Program? 
Although it is common knowledge that stakeholder participation ensures that projects or 
programs are operated and managed more efficiently, effectively and sustainably, this 
common sense information was rarely put into effective practice in the HESAWA program. 
Participation ensures efficiency because, by involving all interested parties, a wider pool 
of knowledge is available that supports better design and implementation and financial and 
other costs may be shared. It also ensures effectiveness because stakeholders' varied 
interests are identified and addressed well in advance and shared ownership of the program 
means there 15 a greater chance of achieving the intended outcome. Finally it ensures 
sustainably because people are encouraged to use their knowledge and take their initiatives, 
and they gain skills and confidence to maintain the benefits once the foreign aid resources 
are formally stopped. 
In any social system, not all individuals share power equally. There is therefore need to 
appreciate the relative strength and weaknesses of different groups within a specific 
political system. Power relations may be reflected in social economic variables such as the 
changing bargaining position between patrons and clients, rich and poor, men and women. 
The imbalance of power between groups often influences both the program design, 
implementation and program impact. Alienation or exclusion from participation in decision-
making in society may 
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be made on ground of age, gender, social status or class. In this sense, if the majority of the 
beneficiary communities are not effectively involved from the design stage of the program, 
they are likely to become victims of development rather than beneficiaries. Moreover, their 
subsequent rejection or misuse of the imposed technology may be a clear indication that it 
bears little or no relation to their existing needs. 
Table 10: Men and Women Participation in HESAWA Activities 
  
Participants 
Activity No. of events 
Men Women 
i. Promotional Meetings 8 205 85 
ii. HESAWA Workshops 25 316 64 
iii. Planning meetings 17 115 58 
Source: Field Work File (1998) 
  
Being adequately informed is the first condition for effective participation in policy and 
decision making and ultimately in program ownership. In all the villages visited, most of 
the leaders (predominantly men), councilors and district-level personnel had attended 
HESAWA promotional meetings, workshops on the HESAWA concept and gender 
awareness. As Table 10 indicates, a few people had been .physically involved in the 
preparatory and training activities of the HESAWA program. Those few who had actually 
participated, displayed some knowledge about the program and detailed information about 
the implementation problems and prospects. How ever, the majority of the water users in the 
twelve villages studied, knew much less about who really owned the program, who 
initiated it, and what the modalities of ownership and management were. Participation at 
the preparatory stage, for those peasants who were lucky, consisted simply of some hastily 
organized meetings with the "foreign experts" and government bureaucrats where they were 
briefed about the objectives and activities of the program in their respective villages. 
Surprisingly, at the implementation stage they were supposedly expected to carry out their 
pre-assigned roles. 
Relatively more men than women respondents had attended HESAWA-sponsored meetings 
and were more familiar with the program and its objectives. Field visits to households and 
water points demonstrated that women, with a few exceptions, were less knowledgeable 
about the HESAWA program than men. Either due to their busy daily schedules, women 
rarely attended HESAWA meetings and workshops, or simply needed prior permission 
from their husbands to do so. Furthermore, relatively more men than women were better 
informed about the costs, maintenance needs, operational and maintenance costs of 
different technologies. Table 11 shows that women committee members were much few 
than the nationally designed number 
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and they attended Village Water Committee meetings less frequently than men. Whereas 
men attendance was 85 percent, women's was only thirty five percent. 
Table 11: Village Water Committee Members' Participation Rates 1996-1998                      
(12 HESAWA Water Committees 
 
Number 
Attendance rate
Average Age Average Years of 
Schooling 
Average 
Men 48 (80%) 59 6.8 85% 
Women 12 (20%) 48 4.6 35% 
Source: Filed Work File (1998). 
Women in general and poorly educated rural women in particular in Tanzania were usually 
culturally restricted in public life. Generally, atypical rural African home, reflects a 
fossilized gendered division of labour which is fundamentally undemocratic. It contains 
within itself some in-built injustices and inequalities in its construct of female-male 
relations. As a result, women tend to be excluded from decision-making processes in their 
respective societies (Kabeer, 1997; Lockwood, 1997; Bryceson, 1994). Results from our 
interviews in Table 11 indicate that fewer (20 instead of the mandated 50 percent) women 
participated in the village water committees as required by the 1991 National Water Policy. 
During our interviews, some of the women openly complained that they were too busy with 
domestic chores to attend HESAWA meetings, or to be involved in the day-to-day 
management of the village water and sanitation systems. Our results indicate that on the 
average women attended only 35 percent of the time. To most of the women interviewed, 
HESAWA simply meant "water and latrines" provided by the government. It was not 
uncommon to hear some women asserting that the HESAWA program was owned by the 
village government or HESAWA village committee and not by them, the water users. Such 
mistaken notions of program ownership are yet another clear manifestation of lack of 
effective participation in critical decision-making by the target population. In this regard, at 
least up to the time of this research, the core HESAWA concept which stresses "effective 
participation by users" and "gender awareness" had had limited success beyond the level 
of perceptions of village male leaders. 
In view of traditional practices where women are usually reluctant or simply culturally 
restricted in their disposition towards speaking out in public, it is hereby recommended that 
of mobilization sessions be done for women alone to sensitize them on basic and applied 
education issues such as civics, gender issues, social duties and responsibilities. This basic 
knowledge would, in turn, be used to better appreciate and understand the specifics of the 
HESAWA program. It is also recommended that more female extension workers at district 
and ward levels be trained to become trainers as well as become effective village 
HESAWA committee members. More education to women is likely to increase their 
political awareness and enhance their empowerment and social inclusion. In the same vein, it 
will be necessary to sensitize men on the need to make the HESAWA program meet women 
needs, and how labour 
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demands on women and their social welfare are affected by the provision of safe water at 
reasonable distances. Above all, councillors and the village leadership should be trained in 
the mobilization of men on gender awareness. The final chapter will deal with this issue 
further. 
5.3.3 Participation: How Effective? 
Ideally, an HESAWA program in any village should originate from the village level and 
work its way up through the system via the wards, districts and the regions to the zonal 
office. Once the village application is accepted by HESAWA officials,, the respective village 
is expected to open its account at the Bank with the initial amount of Tshs. 60,000. This is 
the only major prerequisite. It is at this stage that a village is said to be integrated in the 
HESAWA program. Integrated villages receive a full resource package through the program. 
During the first year, the program is expected to put into place the necessary water and 
sanitation infrastructure. This includes the construction of new wells, rehabilitation of 
traditional wells, construction of piped schemes, improvement of traditional water sources, 
construction of both institutional and household rainwater harvesting tanks, washing slab 
construction, and casting of water jars. The program is further accompanied by a 
comprehensive program of human resource development and health and hygiene education. 
Training activities include support to and training of village HESAWA Committees, village 
health workers, and traditional birth attendants carried out in workshops, seminars, courses 
and meetings. 
According to HESAWA procedures, there is a one-year guarantee period after the completion 
of the construction of the water and sanitary system. During this period, HESAWA provides 
not only the financial and technical assistance, but also donates tool-kits to all village 
HESAWA functionaries (i.e. pump attendants, pump mechanics, artisans, traditional birth 
attendants, and village health workers). Again, during the one-year guarantee period, the 
community is made aware of the financial and technical implications that are likely to follow. 
To the largest extent possible, activities started within the program are expected to rely on 
the local resource base. In many cases, investments will be shared, although the respective 
communities are expected to be fully responsible for the management, financing, operation 
and maintenance of the facilities after completion. Thereafter, depending on the resources 
available on the ground, a village is said to have graduated and is said be "phased-out" on its 
own. The water supply facilities in the village are put directly under the responsibility of the 
beneficiaries. The Village HESAWA Committees take over from the HESAWA officials. In 
theory, the District HESAWA officials are expected to monitor the progress of the phased-out 
villages. As we shall have occasion to demonstrate, this has not always been the case. 
Although villages prepare annual plans and pass them up through the system, the final plans 
which are implemented are said to bear little or no real relationship to the needs originally 
expressed at the village level. This anomaly is said to originate from limited resource 
capacity at the village, ward and even district level or over-optimistic planning at lower 
levels. The decision over HESAWA plans and budgets rests with the Annual Review Meeting 
and in operational terms with the National Directorate and the zonal coordination office  
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which have influence in the budget allocation. It is at this highest level of decision-making 
that projects are conceived, planned and budgeted for implementation at lower levels. As can 
be depicted from the Table 12, the beneficiary population tends to be fully involved only at 
the implementation stage in the project cycle after the village water committees have been 
formed and the HESAWA Village Water Fund had been created. 
Table 12: Levels of Beneficiary Participation (in percentage) 
 
Project stage Level of Participation
very good   good averag
e
poor Total 
1 . project identification 0 5 15 80 100 
2. project formulation 0 8 20 72 100 
3. project financing 4 0 25 61 100 
4. project implementation 55 25 15 10 100  . 
5. project evaluation 15 30 30 25 100 
Source: Field Work File (1998). 
In order to investigate further the extent of community participation in decision making 
process, we asked water users their role in determining the location of water facilities in their 
respective villages. Convenient access and adequate spatial location of water facilities are 
essential ingredients for ensuring high level of coverage, continued maintenance, water 
safety, and in some cases, to ensure that installed facilities are not vandalized. One robust 
condition necessary to attain the above goals is a good site selection (within the limits posed 
by local hydro-geological conditions) which is a result of effective participation of the target 
population. As Table 13 shows, other than the indicator on agricultural potential, the other 
two criteria of locating HESAWA water points scored very poorly. On measuring the level 
of strictness regarding the location of water points, the two basic criteria of high incidence 
of water-related diseases and the distance from reliable safe water scored 12 percent 
respectively. On the same criteria, villagers were of the opinion (62 and 68 percent 
respectively) that the officials ignored the laid down criteria and procedures of determining 
the location of water points. 
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Table 13: Criteria for Water point Location: Levels for Adherence 
Criteria Levels of Adherence in Percentage 
 very not strictly ignore
i.  high agricultural potential 48 36 16 
ii. high incidence of       
    water related diseases
12 26 62 
iii. Long distance from reliable 
     safe water 12 20 68 
 
Source: Field Work File (1998) 
Ideally, there are four HESAWA criteria that ought to be considered in deciding on the 
location of the water point. A village should demonstrate a high agricultural potential; it 
should have the highest incidence of water-related diseases; and, should have the longest 
distance to reliable safe and adequate water resources (HESAWA Report, 1994). Tn practice, 
however, these criteria were not always adhered to. It was discovered, for example, that 30 
water points or 45 percent of 68 water points were unevenly or inappropriately distributed. 
Several explanations were given. In the first place, it was found out that some District Water 
officers in collusion with influential villagers selected locations for four villages without 
invoking the HESAWA's consultation principle. In the two of the villages studied, water 
points were located along the main road where some influential families in the village live. 
As a result, poor peasants living far off the road complained bitterly about this arbitrary 
decision. The three charges that were frequently made were that some District officials were 
lazy, corrupt, and favored the well-to-do. In the other three villages, most of the shallow 
wells were located right in the compounds of the richer families who had contributed money 
at the early stages of the water schemes implementation. Surprisingly, these families claimed 
that they owned these wells and charged user fees without any consultations with either the 
Village HESAWA Committee or the Village Governments. 
Table 14: Community Perceptions of Relations with District HESAWA Experts 
 
Relations No. of % of Total 
Poor 162 15
Fair 172 16 
Good 60 56
Very good 97 9 
Do not 32 3
Total 108 10
Source: Field Work File (1998) 
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The above accusations of some of the District officials have strong foundations. As 
Tables 14 and 15 indicate, strong feelings were expressed by many respondents that 
some District HESAWA officials tended to ally themselves with the more elite 
sections of the rural population. They tended to relate differently with different social 
groups depending on their economic position, political access, and their life styles. It 
was further claimed that the relatively well-to do peasants had more resources to 
contribute to the water and sanitation program and were more willing to take risks. Hence 
they were perceived as easier to organize and more rewarding to work with both 
personally and professionally. Poor peasants, on contrast, were perceived to be difficult 
people to work with. Their needs were greater and their resources fewer. This, rather 
unfortunate group, is what Robert Chambers described as essentially "invisible to 
administrators" (Chambers, 1980). It would thus appear that to some of the HESAWA 
officials poor peasants remained invisible. 
Table 15:     Characteristics of the Public Gloss of HESAWA Officials' Perspectives                     
on Poverty Alleviation Partners 
 
Characteristics Rich Peasants Poor Peasants 
(i) Economic position Resourceful to invest Not resourceful 
(ii) Political access Easier to organise, few in 
number, and policy 
makers have specific 
Harder to organise, 
lack access 
(iii) Life styles More self-asserting, more 
rewarding to work with, 
open to change 
Less self-assertive, 
less achievement 
oriented, 
conservatives, less 
Source:     Field Work File (1998). 
Overall, the quality and quantity of water supply that was provided by the HESAWA 
program were, on the whole, very poor. According to data in Table 16, only a small 
proportion of the sampled population (about 12.6 percent) were satisfied with the 
quality, quantity and the tariff charged on HESAWA -supplied water systems in their 
respective villages. These were the well-to-do members in every village visited. The 
easy availability of water has made them change some of their health behaviour, e.g. 
hand washing after defecation, more frequent body wash and regular washing of 
clothes. Moreover, the easy availability of water had enhanced the potential for reduction 
of disease and the achievement of general health and hygiene improvements. This 
relatively small group in the sample further reported that they now have more time not 
only for leisure but also could spend more of it on productive activities: Some of them 
had even initiated small irrigated gardens near their houses while a few others had 
commercialized domestic water use as one way of supplementing their incomes. To 
this group, the HESAWA Program was one of the most effective aid initiatives that 
they had experienced in a long time. 
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Table 16 Perceptions of Water supply quality (in percentage)
 
Problem Category Issue Big problem Small problem No problem 
Access long distance 65 25 10 
Quality poor facilities poor 
water quality 
75 
45 
15 
30 
10 
25 
Affordability too expensive 10 75 15 
Supplies acute shortage 90 7 3 
Source: Field Work File (1998). 
Table 17: Women Perception of HESAWA Water Services (in percentages) N= 648 
 
Category Issue Big problem Small problem No problem 
Quality Cleanliness 68 28 4 
Access Distance 56 36 8 
Affordability Ability to pay 35 36 29 
Supplies Reliability 65 25 10 
Source: Field Work File (1998) 
 
Table 17 presents women responses to the HESAWA program. When women were asked the 
same questions, overwhelmingly the majority of them were not satisfied with the FIESAWA 
program. On all the four issues, namely water quality, access, affordability and supply, 
women more than men were particularly concerned about the water problem in their 
respective villages. About 68 percent of all women interviewed thought that the quality of 
water \\as generally poor. About 56 percent of the women interviewed thought that the 
distance to the HESAWA water facilities was a big problem. Relatively less women were 
concerned about the price of water. If it were of good quality, accessible and reliable, most 
of them would have easily afforded it. Finally, about 65 percent of the women 
interviewed were of the opinion that HESAWA water was chronically unreliable. If 
women were the HESAWA program's initial target population, then the above disturbing 
findings should 
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worry both SIDA and the government of Tanzania. The project shows that it was poorly 
designed and implemented right from the start. 
The overall picture emerging from the study is that the HESAWA program was a blessing 
to a tiny, minority of the well-to-do members of the villages under study. According to the 
core objectives of the program, this group comprised of the non-target population. The 
availability of clean and. reliable water in their houses or neighborhoods certainly improved 
the quality of their lives. It reduced the time that their families spent on collecting water. 
Additionally, such facilities afforded them additional time to undertake other activities such 
as growing food, searching for firewood and taking care of children. For this category of the 
population, time saving was ranked the most important benefit of the HESAWA program. 
It is interesting to note also that private water facilities were well maintained and the owners 
did not complain about shortages of spare parts or about inefficient technicians. Both were, 
available and affordable. 
However, for a large majority of the poor respondents the continued insufficient availability 
of water both in quality and quantity was perceived as the biggest problem (65 percent). On 
the average water charges and other contributions to the public water system cost around 
Tshs. 800 a month or Tshs. 9600 household per year which was cheaper than education and 
health but the vast majority of the population in both regions could still not afford to pay this 
amount given the nature of competing priorities amidst scarce resources. In other words, the 
HESAWA Program seemed to have markedly increased the cost of living for the rural poor 
without correspondingly alleviating their poverty situation. 
Over a third or 45 percent of respondents continued to rely on unimproved traditional water 
sources. Water from these sources was not only unsafe in quality but also unreliable in supply 
and found at relatively long distances. In fact, to this group of respondents, the access to 
clean water became an acute problem during the dry season. Another one third or 32 percent 
of respondents used improved, aid-supported public taps, bore holes, or water from gravity 
schemes, while 20 percent used HESAWA-rehabilitated shallow water wells. The remaining 
relatively well-to-do 3 percent of the respondents had water in their premises either as 
domestic taps or in the form of rain water harvesting tanks. 
. 
Worse still, for most people in Mwanza and Kagera regions the distances to HESAWA-
constructed public water sources was considered too long and unbearable. As earlier pointed 
out, this problem was partly but largely due to the arbitrary selection of locations of various 
water points by some corrupt District Water and HESAWA officials or partly due to village 
power politics. This is one of the cases of resource leakage from the poor sections of society 
to the well-to-do. On the average, a trip to collect water took over one hour, and each 
household made an, average of four trips a day, meaning that a typical rural household spends 
nearly five hours per day collecting water! About 40 percent of the households have to travel 
up to one-half kilometer to fetch water and about 30 percent have to travel for more than one 
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kilometer to do the same. There is therefore need to emphasize not only the importance of 
the role of effective participation by the target population but also the need to ensure 
enforcement of village bye-laws in order to minimize complaints about the biased locations 
of village water points. 
 
A higher proportion of respondents (75 percent) stated that the water quality was poor. 
However, it is important also to note that the perception of water quality in the rural areas of 
Tanzania was simply its visual quality. Little is so far known about the turbidity, bacterial 
content acidity and other physical, chemical and biochemical quality of the water provided 
through the HESAWA program. Another 45 percent complained about the poor status of the 
water facilities. Some respondents even raised doubts about the professional competence and 
effectiveness of the HESAWA technicians at the district level. The depths of some 
HESAWA-supported shallow wells were often less than 10 meters with constant low yields 
particularly during the dry seasons. Access to HESAWA water was so acute during dry 
seasons that people went without taking a bath or washing for weeks! 
In addition, due to frequent pump breakdowns coupled with a chronic shortage of spare parts 
more than a third of the HESAWA Program water systems had been in disrepair for more 
than one year. This is despite the fact that every village is expected to have HESAWA trained 
water attendants and technicians. The problem was much more prevalent in the phased-out 
villages where HESAWA resources had been formally stopped. Thus, poor maintenance of 
the water systems was identified as one of the major problems, reflecting both the widespread 
shortage of spare parts, lack of financial resources, and lack of regular and reliable technical 
advise from HESAWA after concluding the phasing-out arrangements. Why should one pay 
for poor and unreliable services? Under normal circumstances, the willingness to pay is 
influenced by the expectation that the supply will be better in quality, quantity and will be 
accessible. Admittedly, chronic problems in the HESAWA program would have been 
avoided had the beneficiary population been effectively involved in decision-making at all 
stages of the program cycle. That strategic approach would have ensured them of program 
ownership right from the word go. However, this was not to be. 
5.3.4 Perceptions about Sustainability 
The second key organizing concept in our analysis is sustainability. Sustainability has been 
defined as the capacity to maintain service and benefits, both at community and agency 
levels, without detrimental effects on the environment, even after special assistance -
managerial, financial and technical - have been phased out (Narayan, 1993). Sustainability 
considers the time horizon of development (Pearce, 1990). It is a development strategy that 
manages all assets, natural resources and human resources as well as financial and physical 
assets. 
Sustainability' can be measured in both static and dynamic perspectives. The static measures 
include the suitability of the technologies installed, the extent to which facilities are 
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functioning at a particular point in time; for example, are pumps and latrines currently 
functioning? The dynamic indicators focus on the likelihood that sustainability will be 
maintained in a changing environment. Within a community, these indicators focus on 
problem-solving capacity, including the ability to organize and mobilize resources, take 
initiative, self-diagnose, resolve conflicts, and generate knowledge and administrative 
systems. 
5.3.5 Technological Sustainability 
Tanzania's declared policy of self-reliance put emphasis on the need for communities to 
embark on those projects and programs for which they could afford to implement and 
maintain. As for donor-supported projects or programs, the philosophy underscored the 
importance of the aid-recipient community to be able to operate and maintain the facilities 
effectively and efficiently after aid resources had been officially terminated. To be sure, a 
technology selected has a direct bearing on the sustainability of the system because of its 
effects on the operation and maintenance costs, skills and spare parts. In a similar vein, one 
of the key HESAWA principles was the need to adopt technologies that were perceived by 
the beneficiaries to be "more appropriate, affordable, replicable, and sustainable".9 
Although the program set out to solve the water problem in the Lake Victoria regions by 
introducing lower cost and simpler technologies suitable for village-level operation and 
maintenance, it made a fundamental mistake of not effectively involving the end users in the 
assessment, selection and choice of which technologies to be adopted. In essence, technology 
assessment should not only focus on the immediate benefits to the poor such as "minimizing 
production costs" of water delivery, but rather both the short and long term benefits and 
effects should be assessed too. This process should entail a la United Nations (1979): 
The extent to which a particular type of technology promotes self-reliance through the use 
of local human and natural resources (i.e import content should be low). 
• its impact on society, culture, economy and environment of the country. This should 
focus on both intended and unintended consequences whether direct or indirect, 
immediate or delayed. 
• employment generation and or spread effects to other sectors of the local economy; and, 
• surplus or profit generation and the risks involved. 
A few questions arise from the above description. How appropriate and effective were 
HESAWA technologies? To what extent were poor peasants involved in the assessment, 
selection and choice of the technologies currently in use? Are they sustainable? There are five 
9  Appropriate technologies for predominantly poor rural societies are construed to mean those technologies 
which are essentially labor intensive, low cost, simple to make, operate, repair and maintain, and have harmony 
with the environment. For more details see Schumacher (1973). 
 40
 14
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
main types of water technologies that HESAWA Program introduced 
in the Lake Victoria regions. They are: 
(i) shallow wells with hand pump or pressure piped; 
(ii) improved traditional water sources in most cases wells but to a lesser extent springs; 
(iii) institutional and household rain water harvesting tanks 
(iv) gravity schemes; and, 
(v) piped schemes. 
Peasants' responses and reactions to HESAWA water technologies were many and varied. 
The following were end users reactions to each type of water technology. 
(1) Shallow Wells 
• they tend to provide cleaner water 
• if well constructed, they may be more reliable and break down less frequently, and 
may provide water throughout the year. 
• give higher user satisfaction 
• operation and maintenance of shallow wells with a hand pump costs between Tshs 
600 to Tshs. 800 per household per year- this may appear little sums of money. 
Surprisingly, in a country where the average per capita income is less than $100, the 
above sums of money for only one single item are, to say the least, beyond the means 
of most rural Tanzanians.   Moreover, most of the HESAWA-built shallow wells 
displayed poor workmanship, poorly constructed wells with inconvenient or faulty 
provisions for placing buckets, pumps discharging water at strange angles. In 
addition most end users doubted the sustainability of the technology itself. More 
specifically, it was reported that: 
• replicability is very much in doubt as it cost about Tshs. 1.5 million for a ten meter 
deep well with a NIRA 85 pump; 
• pumps are either poorly maintained without regular greasing, wobbly fastenings or 
rusty bodies; 
• cracks in the concrete work were not uncommon; 
• inadequate drainage; 
• tend to dry out during extended dry seasons; 
• water is usually undrinkable i.e it is either bitter or salty; 
• susceptible to poor surveying or technical errors; and, 
• spare parts are expensive and difficult to find. 
(2) Improved Traditional Water Sources 
• they provide "softer" water than shallow wells 
• they are cheaper to construct and maintain than shallow wells. However, objective 
standards for "improvement" were sloppy, due largely to inadequate design, poor 
workmanship, and inadequate consultations with users. It was further emphasized 
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that the practice in the HESAWA program of by-passing end users in the 
development stage tends to reproduce faulty or culturally unacceptable 
improvements. 
(3) Piped Schemes (either using electric pump or solar pump) 
• more advanced technology in the water delivery system and has higher user 
satisfaction. 
• better water quality 
• provide great convenience to users 
 
However, piped scheme suffer from frequent breakdowns, with broken or clogged pipes. 
• expensive to operate and manage 
• tend to have frequent faulty babcock 
• demand skilled technicians to operate and manage it 
• spare parts are expensive and difficult to find 
• not easily replicable 
(4) Rain Water Harvesting Tanks 
• provide great convenience to users 
• give higher user satisfaction 
• highly reliable - a 600,000 liter capacity can run throughout the entire dry season 
• 
However, rain water harvesting tanks require a big initial investment as well as a house 
roofed with corrugated iron sheet or tiles, construction costs are prohibitive for most rural 
people e.g the smallest household rain water jar of 1,000 liters costs about Tshs. 20,000. 
(5) Gravity schemes 
• most reliable of them all 
• high user satisfaction 
 
However: 
• they demand technical precision in the selection of right size pipes. 
• they require a lot of initial labor for construction 
• high investment costs 
• attendants require specialized training. 
5.3.6    Lessons from Perceptions of End-users 
What lessons can be drawn from the perceptions of end-users about water technologies that 
were introduced by the HESAWA Program in the two regions? Four lessons are in order. 
Under normal circumstances, the acceptance or rejection rate of new technologies and 
practices will depend fundamentally on two related factors. First, it is likely to depend, for 
the most part, on the recipient's participation both in the identification of the perceived 
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problem and in the search for possible solutions. In other words, a target population is likely 
to be more anxious to get solutions to the problems that they themselves have identified and 
would perceive themselves as an integral part of the solution process thus readily embracing 
the technical solutions suggested for adoption or adaptation. The HESAWA case study neatly 
falls in the category of donors who continue to hold idle and false notions that development 
in the South in general and poverty alleviation in particular could be engineered through 
projects and programs designed with little regard for the social and material realities of the 
recipient societies. 
Equally important, community participation in the search process for possible solutions to 
poverty problems would significantly enhance the self-confidence of the poor and would 
instil in them a sense of empowerment. As Herrera (1973) poignantly observed, technology 
users are likely to provide critical insights for any successful introduction and adoption of 
new technologies, processes, and products if they are purposely engaged in a search for 
solutions to their problems. On the question of users' participation in influencing research 
directions and priorities, he counsels: 
The basic principles involved in the generation of technologies for rural 
areas are also valid for the whole society, although the mechanism for 
their implementation could be somewhat different...Two of the 
essential elements...are the utilization of local knowledge and 
participation of the local people in the whole process (Herrera, 1973:27). 
As the HESAWA water technologies have amply demonstrated, they were essentially 
selected and chosen by the Swedish Consulting firms with little or no consultations with the 
end users in Kagera and Mwanza'regions. Even the program fundis and technicians were 
incorporated in the process late in the day. Ideally, comprehensive baseline studies of both 
the limitations and the useful aspects of the indigenous water systems would have served as 
a rational starting point. Target communities always possess information and ideas that can 
add value to the intended project. In addition, a general establishment of the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the Lake regions would have shown the dynamic social elements in which 
particular technologies could be prudently immersed. Lack of effective participation by the 
target population as well as limited background information on the society and its 
environment by the aid agencies meant that these agencies were not likely to propose 
development solutions that were comprehensive, culturally non-offensive, or congruent with 
indigenous cognitive and social systems pertaining to household water supply systems. 
One would even stretch the argument further by saying that even if the foreign consultants 
had found out the real needs of the rural poor as well as their absorptive capacity, they 
were further inhibited by the wide cultural differences that separate societies of the so-called 
First and Fourth worlds. Discussing the limitations of a foreign cultural baggage on 
technology 
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transfer, distinguished economist Schunlacher (1973) tersely captured this argument by 
candidly and rhetorically asking: 
The aid givers - rich, educated, town-based- know how to do things in their 
own way; but do they know how to assist self-help among two million 
villages, among two thousand million villagers- poor, uneducated, country-
based? They know how to do a few big things in big towns: but do they 
know how to do thousands of small things in rural areas? They know how-
to do things with lots of capital; but do they know how to do them with lots 
of labor- initially untrained labor at that? 
The third explanatory factor is closely related to the second. The rate of adoption of new 
technologies and practices and the ability to replicate them would depend mainly on cost 
considerations. All other things being equal, it is posited that relatively low cost technologies 
have a greater chance of acceptability than expensive ones. In the HESAW A Program, much 
as there were five different types of water technologies with varying price ranges, most poor 
peasant farmers still found the so-called "cheapest" technological option available to be too 
expensive for their pockets. In two practical cases, payments seem to have reached a 
threshold of affordability and willingness to pay. Specifically, when a 5 5 percent (about Tshs. 
500,000) payment for a 23 cub. meter tanks plus labor and sand; and a 10 percent payment 
for gravity systems were introduced in Mwanza rural districts, HESAWA expected and found 
vanishing demand. Above all, the recently introduced cost sharing system in HESAWA 
phased-out villages has driven many relatively poor peasants back to unreliable and unsafe 
traditional water sources. Indeed, if the intended aid beneficiaries are unable to enjoy the 
benefits of the aid-supported program largely because of their inability to pay, then, 
obviously something may have gone terribly wrong somewhere. 
Finally, the capacity for proper operation and maintenance of the water facilities at the village 
and ward levels presupposes the presence of a critical mass of well trained, experienced and 
adequately remunerated personnel on the ground. The village interviews and water point 
inspections amply demonstrated that the quality of technicians was disproportionately low 
given the number of different water technologies. Admittedly, the short induction courses 
that were being offered by the program to semi-illiterate peasants did not measure up to the 
complexities of routine operation and maintenance of the water systems that were introduced 
in Mwanza and Kagera Regions. Worse still, caretakers, pump attendants and pump 
mechanics often quit their jobs either due to under-utilization or for not being adequately 
remunerated by their village committees. Unless a new incentive package for the water 
system attendants is devised and the training upgraded, it is highly unlikely that the program 
will be able to survive in the current and future phased-out villages. In those circumstances, 
the ultimate program objective of improving the health and welfare of the rural population 
in Tanzania would not be achieved. 
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5.3.7 Financial Sustainability. 
Out of the total HESAWA budget, the Governments of Sweden and Tanzania agreed to 
contribute an approximate ratio of 10:1. Little seems to have changed in the last one decade 
and half. Viewed retrospectively, these budget allocations are, ab initio, inordinately tilted 
against aid recipients. One would have expected that, by invoking HESAWA basic principles 
of ownership and sustainability, the government of Tanzania and the respective aid-targeted 
communities would have slowly but inexorably reviewed upwards their respective budgetary 
contributions towards the HESAWA program. However, going through different Program 
documents, there is no indication that this idea has ever been seriously and systematically 
explored. 
Similarly, there seem to be no discernible indications that the Swedish Government, as a 
concerned development partner, has had any immediate intentions of pressurising the 
Government of Tanzania to step up its contributions in order to promote the noble objectives 
of the program. In fact, government subventions to regional and local governments have 
systematically been declining over the last decade or so. The failure on the part of the central 
government and respective local governments to design joint imaginative strategies for 
eventual program ownership is a clear manifestation of imprudent economic management. 
Aid dependence seems to be a permanent solution to the poverty question in Tanzania! 
Paradoxically, what is currently being debated within the HESAWA and government circles 
is to step up a cost sharing system by the water end-users. In the current phase, HESAWA 
is considering to develop and introduce a system whereby the beneficiaries will be required 
to share a greater portion of the costs for the physical installations in addition to the 
contributions in labor and in kind that are currently being provided. In addition, they are 
considering the possibilities that reasonable savings for the operation and maintenance will 
be set aside by the Village HESAWA Fund through either the sale of water, user fees or 
annual financial contributions. By contributing to investment costs, so the argument goes, 
communities will be expected to get a better understanding of the costs involved; they will 
carefully consider alternative solutions; and above all, will become more committed to the 
solutions that they will eventually select. 
As for HESAWA officials, the introduction of contributions to the investment costs are 
expected to have the following spin-offs: 
• reduce the Program costs for installation, thereby making it possible to finance additional 
facilities to more     communities; 
• serve as a tool in prioritizing requests, thereby facilitating balanced program expansion; 
and, 
• pave the way for post-program period, when all costs will have to be borne by the 
community. 
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There are several serious contradictions that flow from the position that is put forward by 
HESAWA. In the first place, the sustainability concept and practice is flawed in several 
important ways. To start with, financial contributions to the HESAWA Program by the 
central Government, Local Governments and the beneficiary communities were set 
ridiculously low in the initial agreement between the governments of Sweden and Tanzania. 
In our view, these initial low budgetary figures would have been revised systematically 
upwards in order to allow the poor rural communities to adjust their household budgets 
accordingly. This was never done. The concept of user fees for services like water in a poor 
rural setting is not likely to be received favourably. 
Not surprisingly, the local budgetary contributions to water programs have been declining 
nationally. More specifically, voluntary annual payments up to the Village Fund do not seem 
particularly impressive. According to the 1996 Ministry of Water Report, all the 
twenty mainland regions had registered 9246 Village Water Committees and 3820 Village 
Water Funds or about 41 and 29 percent of the anticipated national totals respectively. The 
total cash contributions collected totaled to only Tshs. 218 millions nationally. This was less 
than 2 percent of the national water budget. In short, the willingness and ability to pay for 
the water services in Tanzania are, to say the least, unsatisfactory. People are naturally 
unwilling to pay for services that are of substandard quality and poorly delivered. 
Secondly, the program has inadvertently failed to examine the role of the poor resource base 
of the targeted population and how to tackle it. The HESAWA program has not contributed 
in any meaningful way to the creation of additional wealth in the two regions studied as was 
anticipated. The water provided (may be also the good health enjoyed) through the program 
has not directly stimulated additional economic activities like irrigation farming nor has it 
generated any indirect economic spill-overs in terms of additional income to the originally 
targeted communities. Unlike Tanzania, aid-supported water projects in Malawi had a 
positive impact on several private industries in the national economy. Those water projects 
used PVC pipes that were produced locally as well as plastic tanks for rain water harvesting. 
In this case the provision of water meant more and better jobs for some members in the 
community. In contrast however, in the case of Tanzania, the water mechanics and other 
fundis who were trained by the HESAWA program have not found any gainful employment 
within or outside the program. In fact, their services are akin to voluntary public services. 
Most Village Water Fund resources are hardly enough big to sustain payment for the 
necessary spares and parts. Worst of all, some of the skills like pump attendance, pump 
mechanics or well point caretaker skills are not easily commercializable in most Tanzanian 
rural settings. If the HESAWA program has not succeeded in stimulating economic activities 
in the rural areas as was initially anticipated, it is highly unlikely that it will be either 
sustainable in the medium term or be able to alleviate poverty in the long term. 
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5.3.8 Institutional Sustainabiliry.  
Development decisions in African countries are usually associated with international 
financing and national plans, making it easy to forget that development happens in the "mere 
encounters of everyday life" (Schaffer and Wen-hsien, 1975). Indeed, the development 
process chiefly depends on the involvement of people at the grass-roots and on the choices 
that they make. Whether or not they are caught up in developmental change is, in turn, 
dependent upon the actions of the agents at the local level. Since the local level officials are 
the most visible link between the government, donor agencies and the public, they also affect 
the public perceptions about the quality of those services. Attitudes toward agents influence 
a wide range of responses to aid-supported development plans and public life. For this 
purpose, we decided to evaluate the role of the Village Water Committees in order to capture 
their effectiveness in achieving the broad objectives of the program. 
In order to measure the institutional health of the HESAWA Village Water Committees we 
used an "institutional maturity index". It included information on each member of the 
relevant committee, the number of meetings it held, the degree of representativeness, 
whether or not a record of decisions taken by the committee had been kept, voluntary 
compliance in the payment contributions into the Water Fund, and campaigns against water 
facility vandalism. This information allowed the researchers to assess the program progress 
as well as provide explanations for success or failure. 
Most of the Village HESAWA Water Committee members interviewed were usually people 
of relatively low socio-economic status and little political clout in their respective village 
social settings thus having resources that hardly allow such committees to enjoy the 
functional competence which is essential to the creation and maintenance of legitimacy. As 
if that was not enough, members on these committees were often not democratically elected. 
It is important to emphasize that the HESAWA program catered for the needs of the entire 
village community not simply for poor people. Almost invariably, those villagers who sat on 
the HESAWA Water Committee were individuals of low social standing. Understandably, 
they usually failed to muster the necessary popular support and legitimacy in their 
communities. Most of them were appointed to their respective committees by village political 
leaders only because they had attended HESAWA Program courses as assistant social 
workers, pump attendants, and the like hence were relatively better informed of the 
HESAWA program than anyone else in their village settings. As Table 17 indicates, about 
two-thirds of the respondents rated their Village HESAWA committees' job performance 
unfavourably. 
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Table 18: Public Perceptions of Village HESAWA Committees' Job Performance 
(N=1080) 
 
Perceptions % of the Total 
poor 42
very poor 18 
fair 12
good 8 
very good 15
do not know 5 
Total 100
Source: Field Work File (1998) 
As Table 18 indicates, well over two-thirds of the people interviewed rated poorly the 
performance of the Village HESAWA Committees. It was not uncommon for community 
members in various villages visited to portray water committees as unreliable and unskilled, 
dishonest, lazy or some combination of these negative characteristics. It seems they lacked 
the necessary support and popular acceptance. It is mainly because of such apparent structural 
weaknesses that Village Water Committees in this study have not succeeded in meeting the 
basic expectations of the HESAWA Program at the grass root level. 
Moreover, it was not uncommon for some Village Water Committees to fail to mobilize 
fellow villagers to undertake routine preventive and corrective maintenance activities like 
pump greasing, bolt tightening, or to campaign against vandalism. Some village committees 
have also demonstrably failed even to call regular meetings. Still others were not been able 
to mobilize fellow villagers to pay their monthly operations and maintenance contributions, 
while others have had their books unedited for many years. Transparency through proper 
record keeping of income and expenditures, and accountability through regular reporting to 
village members had not been fully institutionalized in most villages that were visited. Little 
wonder that many water systems in phased-out villages were taken over by equally inefficient 
and inexperienced village governments. 
It was also a common concern among several villagers in the HESAWA Program that Village 
Water Committees were squandering the Water Fund resources. In many instances, it was 
reported that the Water Fund was jointly operated by three of the five committee members. 
In such circumstances, a village had to dispatch by bus three signatories to the nearest 
National of Commerce Bank branch in order to draw funds to purchase spare parts and other 
accessories. Bus fares and daily allowances for three village officials depleted the Water 
Fund in a couple of far outlaying villages in Kagera and Mwanza Regions. This problem is 
essentially a management one. Concerned villages would be advised to look into more 
relevant and appropriate systems of operating and managing the village water funds. 
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6. Conclusion 
The study has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of one foreign aid project in promoting 
economic growth and, ultimately, alleviating poverty in rural Tanzania. The findings directly 
challenge the main stream development paradigm which essentially is expert stance, supply 
driven, top-down and modernization orientated. In the HESAWA program case study, a 
number of policy and institutional issues seem to have gone terribly wrong right from the 
outset. To the extent that the government of Tanzania continues to be haunted by absence of 
a flexible aid policy with efficient and effective administrative oversight, HESAWA program 
experts tended to exert an overwhelming influence over project selection, design, planning 
and even implementation. Under such circumstances, the unrestrained aid experts paid 
inordinate attention to project design and implementation issues rather than whether or not 
the program met the real needs of the rural poor. The concept of participatory decision-
making by the target population remained at best, on paper and at worst at the rhetorical 
level. The poor people were rarely consulted on issues of basic development concern. 
Secondly, various program implementation agreements lacked explicit, concrete and realistic 
outcome objectives and clear and reasonable time horizon From the beginning, little effort 
was made to establish, in concrete terms, the scope of the program, its approximate cost, 
Tanzania's resource contributions over time, program performance evaluation criteria, 
contributory economic activities to augment the rural poor's incomes, and above all, the time 
frame for SIDA's support to the HESAWA program. Such a framework would have 
realisticatically assigned different roles and responsibilities to different actors for different 
time frames. 
Thirdly, the HESAWA program planning and implementation documents have three separate 
rather than one integrated HESAWA program budget. The first is village-level budgets which 
are expected to consist of allowances for water systems operators, purchase of spare parts and 
some petty cash for any contingencies. The second is the regional and district-level budgets 
which consist of salaries and allowances for government employees directly connected with 
the HESAWA program. The third budget is the aid-supported budget which covers both 
recurrent and development aspects of the program. Furthermore, different budgets were 
accountable to different authorities! This arrangement definitely has shortfalls, not only in 
the context of program integration and sustainability but also with regard to the objectives 
of institution capacity building at all levels. After more than fifteen years of HESAWA 
existence one would have expected to find a consolidated program budget, managed and 
operated by respective regional authorities. It is hereby recommended that all the key actors 
re-examine more flexible but practical institutional modalities of how to manage the program 
budget on a sustainable basis. 
Fourthly, the study has also produced evidence to demonstrate that lack of popular 
participation in decision-making by the target population at each and every stage of the 
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project cycle contributed to inevitable but predictable negative consequences. The study has 
therefore singled out effective participation in decision-making as one of the sine qua non 
conditions for a successful project or program development. However, it should be cautioned 
that participatory development does not take place in a social vacuum. It is only conceivable 
in a specific socially engineered institutional framework. Arguably, in aid-supported 
programs, members of the beneficiary group should collectively decide on the institutional 
framework for their respective grassroots initiatives. This can conveniently take place where 
there is a group of people with a relatively homogeneous socioeconomic background. As 
several empirical studies have observed, such grassroots-based groups serve a number of 
crucial functions. Firstly, they provide a forum for dialogue, analysis and reflection thereby 
contributing to the capacity of these members to find solutions to their commonly perceived 
problems. Secondly, membership in village groups reduces individual insecurity and 
dependency and builds self confidence. Such groups enable the individual poor to transform 
their individual weakness into collective strength, thus enhancing their bargaining power vis-
a-vis other powerful economic groups and local power structures. Thirdly, such groups 
constitute appropriate structures for launching, ownership, management and operation of 
village initiated projects and programs (Ghai, 1988; Hirschman, 1984; Gran. 1983). 
Finally, for village development groups to form,.prosper and mature, the role of development 
workers variously described as social activists, change agents, facilitators, group organizers, 
catalysts or animators is of critical importance. These have to emerge from within the aid 
beneficiary villages themselves. The Village Water Committees were comprised of 
heterogeneous characters who sought for some paid employment in their respective village 
water schemes. As the supposed animators, the pump attendants, traditional birth attendants 
or village fundis were expected to possess a deep understanding of their respective village 
economies and society, to be compassionate and sympathetic to the plight of the poor, and 
to be able to inspire confidence and trust in fellow villagers. This was hardly the case in the 
HESAWA program. Furthermore, ill-prepared and undemocratically appointed animators 
were one of the root causes for the marginal performance of the HESAWA program. It is 
recommended that the program should rethink of new ways of recruiting key village water 
management personnel. Democratically elected individuals would be the best suited for this 
kind of participatory development work as they would inevitably be accountable to those who 
elected them to office. 
 
 
 51
Fordign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
References 
Adam, C. et. Evaluation of Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania. 
Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994. 
• 
Addisson, T. "Poverty Reduction in Development Cooperation: The Story So Far" in Poverty 
Reduction and Development Cooperation. CDR Working Paper 94.6 1994:27-36. 
 
Aldelman, I. and C. Morris. Economic Development and Social Equity in 
DevelopingCountries. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1973. 
Baulch, B. "The New Poverty Agenda: A Disputed Consensus", IDS Bulletin 27 (1) 1996:1 8 
Bossuyt, J. etal. New Avenues for Technical Cooperation. Maastricht: ECDPM Occasional 
Paper, 1991. 
Bryceson, D. "Easing Rural Women Working Day in sub-Saharan Africa", Development 
Policy Review Vol. 12 (1) 1994:59-68. 
Chabal, P. Power in Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 
Cassen, R. et al. Does Aid Work? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
Chambers, R. "Poverty and Livelihood: Whose Reality Counts", IDS Discussion Paper 347. 
Brighton Sussex, 1995. 
Collier, P. et al. Labour and Poverty in Rural Tanzania. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990. 
Cornia, G. et al. Adjustment with Human Face Vol. 1: Protecting the Vulnerable and 
romoting Growth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 
Forss, K. Planning and Evaluation in Aid Organizations. Stockholm: Economic Research 
nstitute, 1985. 
Ghai, D. "Participatory Development: Some Perspectives from Grassroot Experiences" 
URJSD Discussion Paper 5, 1988. 
Gran, G. Development by the People: Citizens Construction of a Just World. New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1983. 
 52
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
Griffin, K. and T. McKinley. A New Framework for Development Cooperation. UNDP: New 
York, 1996. 
Harsh, E. "More African States as Least Developed" in Africa Recovery 6 April, 11992:11. 
Herrera, I. "Social Determinants of Science in Latin America: Explicit Science Policies and 
Implicit Science Policies" in Cooper, C. (ed). Science, Technology and 
Development. London: Frank Cass, 1973:19-39. 
HESAWA. Annual Progress Reports (various years). 
HESAWA. Mid-Term Evaluation Reports (various). 
HESAWA. Consultants Reports (various years). 
Hirschman, A. Getting Ahead Collectively. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. 
Kabeer N. "Editorial: Tactics and Trade-Offs: Revisiting the Links Between Gender and 
Poverty" IDS Bulletin Vol. 28 (3) 1997:1-13. 
. 
Khothari, R. Poverty: Human Consciousness and Amnesia of Development. London: Zed 
Books, 1993. 
Krueger, A and V. Ruttan. The Development Impact of Economic Assistance to LDCs. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
Lewis, A. Evolution of Foreign Aid. University of Cardiff, 1971. 
Lockwood, M. "Reproduction and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa". IDS Bulletin Vol. 28 (3) 
1997:91-100. 
Madeley, J. When Aid is No Help: How Projects Fail and How They Could Succeed. 
London: Intermediate Technology. 
Maxwell, S. "Apples, Pears and Poverty Reduction: An Assessment of British Bilateral Aid", 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 27 (1) 1996:109-122. 
Mason, A. "Targeting the Poor in Java", IDS Bulletin Vol. 27 (1) 67-83. 
Mosley, P. Overseas Aid: Its Defense and Reform. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987. 
 
 53
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
Mosley, P. and R. Dahalr "Lending to the Poorest: Early Lessons from Small Farmers' 
Development Program in Nepal" Development Policy Review Vol. 3 (1) 1985:193- 
207. 
Mkandawire, T. "Fiscal Structures, State Contraction and Political Responses in Africa", in 
Mkandawire, T. and A. Olukoshi (eds). Between Liberation and Oppression: The 
Politics of Structural Adjustment. Dakar: CODESTRIA Book Series, 1990:20-51. 
Munuo, E. Initiating and Managing a Practical Participatory Development Program. 
Dar es Salaam: Kitabu Publishing House, 1992. 
Mushi, S. "Aid and Development: An overview of Tanzania's Experience" in Mushi, S. and 
H. Kjekshus (eds). Aid and Development: Some Tanzanian Experiences. Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 19980:9-50. 
Mutahaba, G. "Foreign Assistance and Local Capacity Building", The European Journal 
of Development Research Vol. 1 (1) 1989:108-123. 
OECD. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows. Paris:OECD (various years). 
 
Radetzeki, M. "Swedish Aid to Tanzania and Kenya: Its Effects on Rural Development" in 
Lele, U (ed). Aid to Africa's Agriculture. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991:232-276. 
Rugumamu, S. Lethal Aid: The Illusion of Socialism and Self-Reliance in Tanzania. 
Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press,1997. 
. 
Rugumamu, S. "Technical Cooperation as an Instrument of Technology Transfer: Some 
Evidence From Tanzania", The European Journal of Development Research 
Vol. 4(1)1992:81-96. 
Sagasi, F. Development Cooperation in a Fractured Global Order. Ottawa: IDRC, 1999. 
4(1) 1999 
Sandstrom S. "The Learning Curve" in Bannatyne J. et al (eds) The World Bank and 
Poverty Reduction. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993-5-14. 
Sawada, Y. "Aid and Poverty Alleviation: An International Comparison" DDS Bulletin 
Vol.27 (1)1996:100-107 
 
Schumacher, E. Small is Beautiful. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. 
 
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
Sen, A. Resources, Values and Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
Sen, A." The Political Economy of Targeting" in Van de Walle& K. Nead (eds) Public 
Spending and the Poor. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press ,1995: 11-24 
 Singer, H "That one Percent Target" IDS Bulletin 3 1970:27-36. 
Stokke, O. "Norwegian Aid: Policy and Performance" in Stokke, O (ed). European 
Development Assistance Vol. 1: Policies and Performance. Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1983: 318-356. 
 
Therkildsen, O. Watering White Elephants. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies, 1988. 
Toye, J. and C. Jackson. "Public Expenditure Policy and Poverty Reduction : Has the World 
Bank Got It Tight?" in IDS Bulletin 27(1) 1996. 
UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Africa Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Program for Social-Economic Recovery and Transformation. 
UNECA: Addis Ababa, 1989. 
United Development Program. Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University 
Press (various years). 
United Nations. Technology Assessment for Development. New York: UN, 1979. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. African Alternative Framework to 
Structural Adjustment Program for Socio Economic Recovery and 
Transformation. Addis Ababa:UNECA, 1989 
United Republic of Tanzania. Water and Sanitation Sector Review :Final Report.      
Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Water, 1995. 
United Republic of Tanzania. The Situation of Women in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: 
Ministry of Community Development, 1988. 
United Republic of Tanzania. Priority Social Action Program: A Summary. 
Government Printer, 1992. 
United Republic of Tanzania. Workshop Proceedings on National Strategies for 
Operation and Maintenance of Rural Water Supply Schemes. Dar es Salaam, 
1988.  
 
 55
Foreign Aid, Grassroots Participation and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: S. Rugumamu 
World Bank. Tanzania Vol. 1. The Challenges of Reforms: Growth, Incomes and 
Welfare. Washington D.C.:World Bank Report No. 14982-TA. 
World Bank. World Development Report. Washington, DC.: The World Bank (various 
years). 
World Bank. Tanzania: A Poverty Profile. Report No. 12298-TA. Washington, DC.: The 
World Bank, 1993. 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs  3.0 Licence. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
